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vEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Drawing on extensive field research, this paper carefully takes apart several agro-export booms in
Latin America in order to identify their direct (adoption of export crops and land access) and
indirect (labor absorption) effects on the rural resource poor. Across countries and regions, these
effects have been heterogeneous and at times even socially problematic in ways that could threaten
the stability of emerging democratic polities. The principal findings of this study are:
1. The experience of agro-export growth is heterogeneous; it neither automatically nor necessarily includes
disadvantaged groups and in some cases has affected them negatively. The challenge is to understand
and learn from this heterogeneous experience; in this spirit, the paper puts forward policy options for
attaining more broadly based agro-export growth.
2. Broadly based agro-export growth will usually require more than market liberalization and an outward-
looking policy orientation. Without a more activist policy, a number of economic factors conspire
against the direct participation of small-scale producers in agro-export production. While the rural
resource poor can indirectly benefit from employment generated by agro-export growth, policy that
leaves small-scale producers uncompetitive in export production is liable to witness medium-term,
induced, structural changes that diminish the land access of the rural resource poor and dampen net
employment effects.
3. The policies needed to generate broadly based growth are to an extent conditional or dependent on the
specific economic context in which growth is to occur. However, two policies that emerge as
unambiguously important are those that improve the small farmer s access to capital and to insurance.
Without such policies, small farm participation in agro-export production will be nonexistent or muted at
best, except in very special circumstances.
In summary, people-friendly—but not market-naive—liberalization must bring back a degree
of microeconomic activism if low-income agrarian economies are to follow paths of sustainable
development with equity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The economic crisis of the 1980s and the shift to outward-looking development strategy ignited
interest in agricultural export promotion throughout Latin America. Export strategies continue to
dominate agricultural development discussion in the region. In many countries, extraordinarily rapid
agro-export growth has been achieved. From the mid- to late-1980s, nontraditional agro-export
production grew at 222 percent in Chile, 78 percent in Guatemala, and 348 percent in Costa Rica.
During the otherwise difficult decade of the 1980s, agricultural exports nearly tripled in Paraguay,
Latin America s most agrarian country.
 
Surrounding these export booms is a literature rich in commodity studies that identify and
evaluate export market niches. While an important component of the export promotion and support
policies that have been pursued in the region, this literature is relatively quiet concerning the U.S.
Agency for International Development s (AID s) fundamental strategic objective of supporting
broadly based economic growth.
2 This paper examines agro-export growth and policy from the
perspective of the strategic objective of broadly based growth that underlies AID s commitment to
agrícultural export promotion. Drawing on extensive field research, this paper carefully takes apart
several agro-export booms in order to identify their direct (adoption of export crops and land
access) and indirect (labor absorption) effects on the rural resource poor in Latin America. Across
countries and regions, these effects have been heterogeneous and at times even socially problematic
in ways that could threaten the stability of emerging democratic polities. The principal findings of
this study are:
The experience of agro-export growth is heterogeneous; it neither automatically nor necessarily includes
disadvantaged groups. In some cases, it has affected them negatively. The challenge is to understand and
learn from this heterogeneous experience; in this spirit, this paper puts forward policy options for
attaining more broadly based agro-export growth.
1.Figures from Barham et at. (1992b) and Weisskof(1992).
2. See the USAID (1992) strategic planning document.2
2. Broadly based agro-export growth will usually require more than market liberalisation and an outward-
looking policy orientation. Without a more activist policy, a number of economic factors conspire
against the direct participation of small-scale producers in agro-export production. While the rural
resource poor can indirectly benefit from employment generated by agro-export growth, policy that
leaves small-scale producers uncompetitive in export production is liable to witness medium tern,
induced structural changes that diminish the land access of the rural resource poor and dampen net
employment effects.
3. The policies needed to generate broadly based growth are to an extent conditional or dependent on the
specific economic context in which growth is to occur. However, two policies that emerge as
unambiguously important are those that improve the small farmer s access to capital and to insurance.
Without such policies, small farm adoption of agro-export crops will be nonexistent or muted at best,
except in very special circumstances. Unfortunately, the same information costs that underlay the failure
of competitive markets to provide small farms with access to capital and insurance also confront public
policy efforts. In the final analysis, broadly based agro-export growth requires nontraditional capital and
insurance access, such as that afforded by group lending programs.
This paper will develop these points in detail against a theoretical background which renders
them intelligible. Before turning to this task, it is useful to identify the full range of levels at which
agro-export growth can affect the welfare of the rural resource poor and to place this work in
context.
1.1 SECTORAL, MACROECONOMIC, AND INTRAHOUSEHOLD EFFECTS
OF AGRO-EXPORT GROWTH
The full impacts of agro-export growth on the well-being of the rural resource poor occur at three
levels. The most fundamental is the sectoral level at which agro-export production takes place.
Radiating upward from this level are secondary, macroeconomic effects; radiating downward are
intrahousehold effects. An exhaustive accounting of the impact of agro-export growth on the well-
being of the rural resource poor would therefore require questions at three levels:
1. At the sectoral level, how broadly based and inclusionary of the rural resource poor is the agro-export
growth process itself? Export growth might work to include or exclude the disadvantaged directly as
producers or indirectly as labor. It could also change land access and prices in ways that affect
smallholders.
2. At the macroeconomic level, what are the secondary employment, income, and price effects generated
across the economy by the changes in income, savings, employment, and traditional crop production in
the agricultural sector?
3. At the househ0ld level, whom does export growth benefit? That is, how are the benefits and costs of the
agro-export growth distributed among household members? Export growth can have a major impact on
returns, resources, and time allocation of different household members in ways that redistribute the
welfare effects of the aggregate income change observed at the household level.3
This paper concentrates on the fundamental sector-level impacts that shape the nature of agro-
export growth. Conclusions drawn from this sector-level analysis thus carry the caveat that they
ignore higher-level multiplier effects. This is a minor limitation, however, inasmuch as the policy
interest in specifically agricultural growth is motivated by a desire to directly reach the
disadvantaged rural groups in which Latin American poverty is disproportionately concentrated.
The demonstrated sluggishness of secondary trickle down to these groups ratifies the wisdom of
this desire.
While concentrating on the sectoral mechanics of agro-export growth, this paper will indicate
how intrahousehold impacts fit into the analysis put forward here. Related work (for example,
Carter and Katz, forthcoming; Katz 1992; Csete and Woldt 1993) considers the intrahousehold
impacts in detail.
1.2 ORGANIZATION AND OVERVIEW OF PAPER
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the conceptual framework
needed to understand the sectoral impacts of agro-export growth on the rural resource poor. Those
effects can be divided into a small-farm adoption effect, a land-access effect, and a labor-absorption
effect. Section 2 argues that all three effects are ultimately interlinked.
Section 3 explores the economic forces that shape the magnitude of the direct (adoption and
land access) and indirect (labor absorption) effects of agro-export growth. Its chief message is that
the agronomic and economic characteristics of agro-export crops interact with the intrinsic
imperfections of rural factor markets to create farm-size biases—biases that are frequently tilted
against small farm production. Given this interaction, a noninterventionist approach to agro-export
promotion is likely to bypass the rural resource poor as direct producers and generate muted labor
absorption effects. While necessary for understanding fully the argument of this paper, the reader
can bypass the detailed economic argumentation in this section without loss of continuity.
Section 4 then summarizes this project s coordinated empirical, farm-level research on agro-
export booms in Chile, Guatemala, and Paraguay. Analysis of these very different growth
experiences helps give form to the largely theoretical economic argument in section 3. In particular,
this research documents the interacting nature of the direct and indirect effects of agro-exports on
the rural resource poor. Most importantly, microeconomic review of these three experiences
establishes this paper s finding of the heterogeneity of contemporary Latin American ago-export
growth. Three appendices included in this paper further summarize our research findings on agro-
export booms in these countries.
Section 5, the centerpiece of the paper, analyzes the range of policy available to foment broadly
based growth. In order of increasing policy activism, policies are divided into those that (1) get
prices and institutions "right"; (2) pick winners for public investment; (3) reform land markets; and
(4) reform information-constrained markets. While the complexity of the problem forbids any simple
policy slogans, section 5 does argue that capital and insurance market reforms will almost always be
necessary if agro-export growth is to be broadly based.4
Finally, section 6 closes the paper with a brief reflection on the desirability of promoting
broadly based growth: Is pursuit of broadly based growth worth it given the likely complexity of the
recommended factor market interventions? While this is a highly complex and value-laden question,
section 6 suggests perspectives from both the U.S. domestic and low-income country policy
contexts that make broadly based growth a goal worth pursuing.
2. IMPACT OF AGRO-EXPORT GROWTH ON THE RURAL RESOURCE POOR:
LINKAGES BETWEEN SMALL FARM PRODUCTION, EMPLOYMENT
GENERATION, AND INDUCED STRUCTURAL CHANGE
Agrarian growth processes can become socially problematic and of questionable social sustainability
to the extent that they bypass and even negatively affect large segments of the rural population—
more specifically, the rural poor. A growth boom can affect individuals directly by increasing
revenues when they adopt export crops or by changing their access to land and other resources, and
indirectly by changing their access to employment opportunities. More precisely, at the sectoral
level, growth is more or less broadly based, or inclusive of the rural resource poor, depending on:
1) whether small-scale units participate directly in the production of the export crops and enjoy the higher
incomes generated from it—the small farm ad0pti0n effect;
2) whether it induces a pattern of structural change that systematically improves or worsens the access of
disadvantaged groups to land—the land access effect; and
3) the degree to which it absorbs more or less labor of landless and part-time farming households—the
labor absorpti0n effect.
In a simple world of identical farmers and scale-neutral markets and technologies, the impact of
lucrative export crops on the rural resource poor would be relatively easy to conceptualize,
measure, and deal with. Large and small farmers would be equally able to participate in the boom,
and no producer stratum would be disadvantaged by land prices that are driven up by an economic
opportunity beyond its reach. In this simple world, agro-export growth would not induce a pattern
of structural change that systematically affects the access of the rural resource poor to land. Labor-
absorption effects would be similarly easy to understand since all producers would produce the
export crop with the same mix of land, labor, and capital. Comparison of labor absorbed
3 per
hectare under the pre-boom cropping pattern with boom-crop labor absorption would suffice to
predict the net employment impact on landless and part-time farming households.
Much of the discussion about the nature of agro-export growth takes place in these simple
terms, taking structure as static and labor absorption as technically determined. Table 1 gives some
idea of the labor intensity of export crops in Latin America based on studies culled from the
literature. As can be seen, the variation in the numbers is staggering, ranging from lows of 20 to 30
person-days per hectare (broccoli, melons) to highs of 200 to 300 (grapes, asparagus), up to even
600 (snow peas) person-days per hectare. Information on labor absorption generated for traditional,
3. The term "labor absorption" is used instead of "employment" since much of small-farm labor used is actually self-
employed. Labor absorption thus refers to the total labor used, be it hired or own labor.5
nonexport crops is rather scarcer, but figures in the range of 100 to 120 person-days per hectare
would be reasonable for smaller-scale producers in Central and South American agricultural
economies.
4 Based on these figures, the labor absorption effect of export growth could thus itself
range from large positive to large negative numbers.
TABLE 1 Summary of literature on labor intensity of export crops
SOURCE CROP LABOR REQUIRED





Cruz (1992) fruit 150-200 and/ha
(grapes-kiwi)





Noe-Pino and Perdomo melon 210 and/ha
(1991) shrimp 109 and/ha
(artisanal)
Glover and Kusterer asparagus 133 and/ha
(1990)
Goldberg (1974) cucumbers 105 and/ha
honeydew 28 and/ha
While the figures reported in table 1 are informative, reality is in fact complex in ways that limit
their usefulness as guides to the labor absorption effect of agro-export growth. In the first instance,
farmers, especially in the dualistic agrarian structures characteristic of Latin America, are
heterogeneous, perhaps in terms of their behavioral logic, but almost certainly in terms of their
access to (or the effective prices they face in) factor and product markets. Because of this producer
heterogeneity, there is no such thing as the labor intensity of an export crop, as the figures in table 1
seem to imply.
Because producers are heterogeneous (in the sense just described), structure of production is
welfare-relevant, meaning that it affects the efficiency and equity of agro-export growth. Who
produces the boom crops determines how intensively they are produced, that is, how much land is
allocated to them and how much employment is generated. Thus, while the different effects of ago-
export booms are to a degree separable (for example, buoyant employment growth could offset the
potentially negative consequences of large-scale displacement of small farmers), over time, the
magnitude of adoption, labor absorption, and land access effects become inherently linked:
4. See figures below, as well as Carter (1989) on Nicaraguan food-crop production and von Braun, Hotchkiss, and lm-
mink (1989) for highland Guatemalan food crops.
SEASONALITY/OTHER
89% in 3 months
92% in 3 months
51% in 3 months
69% in 3 months












In the short term, the employment generated by an export boom depends on the size distribution of
the farms that initially adopt the production of export crops. As a massive body of theoretical and
empirical literature indicates, large farmers are likely to produce any given crop with less labor per
hectare than would a small farmer.
In the medium term, an agro-export boom could induce a pattern of structural change that in turn
generates further changes in net employment by systematically shifting land from more to less
labor-absorbing large-scale producers.






Land access - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Labor absorption
medium term
The impact of export growth on the rural resource poor in the real world thus depends
critically on the interacting effects of differential adoption, induced structural change and labor
absorption. The interaction can be positive, with structural shifts in land to small-scale producers
who thus benefit directly and who also generate more employment per hectare. The interaction
can also be negative, as it was in seventeenth-century United Kingdom and mid-twentieth-
century Central America, where an unsavory interaction of diminished land access for the rural
poor and weak labor absorption surrounded rapid agrarian growth with social controversy and
political instability. The growth booms of contemporary Latin America present a varied
experience, which includes both broadly based and highly exclusionary growth processes. The
goal of the next section is to understand the factors that underlie this heterogenous experience.7
3. ECONOMICS OF EXPORT-CROP PROFITABILITY AND INDUCED
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN DUALISTIC AGRARIAN STRUCTURE:
IDENTIFYING LEVERS FOR POLICY
What are the factors that determine the direction and magnitude of the short-term and medium-term
effects of an agro-export boom on the rural resource poor? How can policy modify those effects?
This section develops the economics of export-crop profitability and induced structural change in
order to answer these questions.
Diagram 1 summarizes the argument of this section. Starting on the left are characteristics of
crops that can become bases for a farm-size bias depending on the nature of factor and product
markets (see section 3.1 for details). Institutions like cooperatives and contract farming can mitigate
some of the biases against small farms (section 3.2). The overall set of prices in the economy shape
how important different farm-size biases are economically. The net result is a set of countervailing
biases and, in general, differential profitability of export production across different operational farm
sizes. Together, these factors determine the short-term effects of export growth: which producers
adopt the new crops and the labor absorption effects of their doing so (section 3.3).
The pattern of land use creates, for each producer, a shadow or "willingness to pay" value for
land. Willingness to pay determines the producer s competitiveness in the land market (section
3.4.1). To the extent that some producers value land much more highly than others, economic
incentives are created for land transfers and induced structural change. How the land market works
given the transactions costs and other constraints confronting participants in that market shapes the
medium-term effects of induced structural change and indirect labor-absorption effects (section
3.4.2). Prices and initial land distribution in the economy will effect the operation of the land market.
Finally, diagram 1 indicates the points of policy entry, that is, the points where policy can
potentially reshape the nature of agro-export growth. Introduced in section 3.5, below, policy
options are discussed in detail section 4 of this paper.
3.1 POTENTIAL FARM-SIZE BIASES IN PRODUCTION OF EXPORTS CROPS
This section outlines characteristics that may economically distinguish export crops from food crops
and that may distinguish different export crops from each other. In the fictional world of full and
complete markets, these characteristics would all be scale neutral and should have no particular
importance in shaping the impact of ago-exports on the rural resource poor. However, in the
actually existing world of transactions costs and intrinsically missing and imperfect markets, the
characteristics of an export crop will shape who can grow the crop, how they grow it, and,
ultimately, how broadly based export growth is.
There are seven characteristics that, in the presence of information-constrained markets,
create "farm-size biases," meaning that they render a crop relatively more profitable when cultivated

































operate independently. The subsection that follows considers the degree to which contractual
partnerships (for example, sharecropping, contract farming) can mitigate farm-size biases.
The basic crop characteristics that can produce biases are:
1. "Interactive labor" intensity. Some crops are highly responsive to interactive labor, meaning that the
quantity or quality of output can be notably increased when laborers make constant and careful
interactive choices. A careful snow pea harvest requires the laborer to constantly decide whether to
harvest a particular plant, and particular pods on a plant, now or later. This crop characteristic creates a
potential farm-size bias because labor markets are intrinsically imperfect in the sense that it is costly,
potential farm-size bias because labor markets are intrinsically imperfect in the sense that it is costly, if
not impossible, to enforce a contract requiring laborers to make all interactive choices with all due
diligence and care.
Supervision of "interactive labor" is extraordinarily costly because a supervisor, in the case of a snow
pea harvest, would have to constantly monitor which pods were harvested and which were left on
specific plants. For other crops, interactive labor is unimportant. Manually harvested sugarcane is an
example of a crop that, while labor-intensive in the usual sense, does not require labor to make
interactive choices. Cane cutters can be paid a piece rate, and it is costless to oversee if they did the job
correctly—either the field is empty of cane or it is not.
 
Small, family labor farms differ from large, labor-hiring farms in that family laborers are motivated by
their ownership of the residual claims to the production processes. 6 Put more simply, family labor is self-
supervising, whereas labor on larger farms is not. It is likely that all crops have at least some production
stage that can benefit from attentive, interactive labor. How much of an econ0mic advantage this feature
creates for family-labor over labor-hiring farms depends on the overall interactive labor intensity of the
crop and the set of relative prices that value output, labor, supervisors, and so forth. For example, if
labor is so plentiful that even supervisors are cheap to hire, then self-supervising labor offers little cost
advantage over hired labor, which must be supervised. For this reason, overall prices and agrarian
structure (which influences relative prices) impact on the economic valuation of the technical interactive-
labor intensity of a production process.
2. W0rking capital intensity. Because of rigid product quality and uniformity standards, many export
crops require large amounts of purchased inputs and large amounts of working capital to finance those
purchases. High working-capital requirements of export crops create a farm-size bias to the extent that
capital markets favor one size of farm over another. While not always the case, even competitive capital
markets tend to favor larger producers with better access to more and cheaper capital,
  and create a bias
against small farms in the production of crops with large working-capital requirements.
3. Human capital intensity. The technical complexity of export crops and their associated inputs
may create high returns to managerial ability and other "human capital" attributes. If operators of
smaller units are on average less educated and technically skilled than operators of larger units and
5. The benefits of the increased quantity or quality ofoutput that results from interactive labor can of course be fore-
gone. A snow pea field, for example, could be harvested all at once, as if it were sugarcane, using either machinery or
"non"-interactive labor. The gross value ofthe produce would be less than that producible with an interactive labor harvest.
6.Ignoring here complications introduced by intrahousehold phenomena.
7. Most theories of preferential large-farm capital access are built around the dual problems of limited collateral of
small farmers and the fixed costs ofinformation.10
if managerial skills are difficult to purchase on the open market, then crops intensive in human
capital may be biased against small farmers. Small farmers
  purchase of managerial and technical
assistance on the market may be hampered by both incentive problems (purchasers of technical and
managerial services may find it difficult to ascertain the quality of the product they bought) and
indivisibility problems (that is, it costs the same amount to receive advice on a 1-hectare plot as on
a 10-hectare plot.
4. Price-quality measurement. As mentioned, export crops often face rigid product-quality requirements,
with prices heavily discounted for inferior-quality products. Because of their ability to mobilin self-
supervising, interactive labor, small family-labor farms may be able to produce higher-quality output.
However, the relative smaller scale of family-labor farms becomes a liability to the extent that
ascertaining product quality is relatively expensive. Detection of pesticide residues, for example, can be
rather costly. An intermediary or a cooperative assembling small lots of output from multiple small
producers may find it prohibitively costly to spot-check the production of each producer for such
residues or other quality attributes. It thus becomes impossible to completely internalize the incentives to
produce a high-quality, pesticide-residue-free product. In effect the fixed costs of information (it costs as
much to spot-check a large lot as a small lot) can create a bias against small-farm production of export
crops: exporters might rather deal with larger producers whom they can penalize for low quality.
5. Product perishability, pr0cessing thr0ughput, and gains fr0m vertical c00rdinati0n. Sugarcane is an
example of a crop that is economically perishable in the sense that it loses its value very quickly if it is
not processed soon after harvest. If, in addition, the facilities to process a crop are costly and fixed in the
short run (for example, a sugarcane mill, a vegetable freezing plant), then product perishability creates
gains from vertical coordination that can schedule agricultural production in such a way as to guarantee
smooth processing throughput and economic use of installed processing capacity. Such gains from
vertical coordination are argued by many to create a bias in favor of large-scale production in some
export ("plantation") crops
6. Investment gestati0n peri0d. Fruit trees and other crops requiring large initial investments that pay off
only after a period of years pose special problems to small fanners. In the first instance, access to loans
to finance the initial investment is likely to be problematic. In addition, individuals whose savings portfo-
lios are small relative to the minimum size of investment needed to create a viable orchard are likely to
find self-finance of long gestation-period investment projects unattractive because self-financing locks
savings up in a very illiquid form (trees), making it useless as a device to finance unexpected consump-
tion and other needs. A "portfolio-size bias" is thus created against small farmers.
7. Output and relative price risks. Export crops are potentially risky compared to traditional food crops
in two ways. First, they may be subject to large fluctuation in output quantity or quality. When working
capital requirements are high, output fluctuations create large financial risk. Second, the export price
relative to food and other consumer prices may also vary. This "relative price risk" is especially
important when the export crop is not edible or storable. Absent a complete set of insurance and future
markets, the risk an individual faces of a consumption sho►tfall is tied directly to his or her wealth,
savings, and self-insurance capacity. In this imperfect market context, risk creates a bias against small
farmers.
To summarize, while most, if not all, agricultural production processes exhibit constant returns
to scale as usually defined, the information-constrained nature of the various ancillary markets that
surround agricultural production tend to create farm-size biases. For any particular crop, some11
biases may favor larger units while others may favor smaller production units. The net economic
valuation of these potentially offsetting biases creates the profitability-farm-size relationship for the
crop. Those size units that enjoy greatest profitability for the crop would be expected to adopt the
crop more frequently and more intensively than farms against which the biases are more severe. The
spillover from differential profitability and agrarian structural change will be discussed momentarily.
3.2 CONTRACT FARMING, SHARECROPPING, AND MITIGATION OF
SMALL-FARM BIAS
As shown in diagram 1, the competitive disadvantages of small farms can be mitigated by
contractual relationships, which establish partnerships between them and larger-scale agents who
enjoy more favorable access to markets. Much of the classical writing on sharecropping (see Jaynes
1982) portrays that contractual form as a partnership between one individual who has access to
cheap (interactive) family labor and a second individual who has access to cheap capital.8.8 By
dividing the claim on final output (that is, making each partner a partial residual claimant on the
production process), sharecropping creates incentives for each partner to diligently provide the
input for which he or she has an economic advantage. An important theoretical paper by Eswaran
and Kotwal (1985) carefully examines the economics of sharecropping as a partnership. They make
two points that are important to the issues considered in this paper. First, they show that while
sharecropping is often the optimal way to organize agricultural production, it remains hampered by
imperfect incentives—it is not a "first best" arrangement. Second, sharecropping will not universally
dominate other forms of production, including large-scale, wage-labor production. Thus, while in
some environments sharecropping may permit small-scale producers to be competitive, it may not
do so at all times and in all places.
This same contingent optimality of sharecropping carries over to the efficacy of other forms
of partnership, especially contract farming, which may be used to bring small farmers into
capital-intensive, export-production processes. Under contract farming, an exporter or other
contracting agent provides working capital and technical assistance to smallholders, who are
disadvantaged in accessing these goods independently in the markets. The bundling (or
interlinking) of these services involves the contractor in the production process, making it
possible for the smallholder to credibly use a standing crop as collateral for the credit and other
services provided. Note that involvement of the exporter or processor in the agricultural
decision-making makes it possible to realize some of the benefits of vertical coordination. Along
a number of important crop-characteristic dimensions, contract farming offers mitigation of
small-farm biases. Like sharecropping, contract farming may permit a small farmer to exercise
his or her labor-cost advantages in a production process that might otherwise require more
working or human capital than the small farmer can mobilize.
Despite the important economic advantages offered by contract farming and other contractual
partnerships, these arrangements are frequently criticized in the literature as being decidedly small-
8. Much of the more contemporary writing examines sharecropping more narrowly as a device to bring labor and land
together, without any consideration of additional factors of production.12
farmer unfriendly (for example, Clapp 1988; Watts 1991). Indeed, under pressure from the farm
community, the Wisconsin (state) department of agriculture recently issued guidelines regulating the
contracts between farmers and processors. At the root of these criticisms of contract farming is the
risk to which contract farmers are exposed. Unfortunately, the risk exposure of contract farmers is
not an accidental attribute of contractual partnership. As the economic theory of incentives makes
clear, in environments of imperfect information, incentives require risk exposure. In other words, it
would be impossible to remove the risk borne by contract farmers without also destroying the
incentives that are needed to make the contractual form work. Like sharecropping, contract farming
is a compromise of multiple market imperfections.
9 And, like sharecropping, its ability to
competitively bring small farmers into an ago-export boom as direct producers is contingent—it
may be possible in some places, or for a while, but it cannot be counted on unconditionally to assure
positive direct effects of ago-export production on the rural resource poor.
An example of the changing "contingent optimality" of contract farming comes from the
experience of highland Guatemala export vegetable production. At least one major exporter shifted
from large-scale direct production to direct contracts with small farmers after discovering that the
labor-cost advantages of the small farmer overwhelmed whatever problems there were in scheduling
production, delivering working capital, and providing technical assistance to multiple small
producers. While the contract farming regime thus appeared as the competitively dominant way of
organizing export vegetable production, that dominance may prove to be short-lived. Interviews
with exporters in late 1990 revealed that some exporters were planning to shift away from contract
farming, at least with the very small-scale producers, because of the increasing expected economic
cost of that form of production organization. Pesticide residue problems on Guatemalan exports
were at that time threatening the price and entry of Guatemalan products to the U.S. market. The
exporters felt it necessary to more intensively supervise the production process. Unfortunately,
intensive supervision of smallholders was seen to be economically infeasible, moving producers
toward either direct production or contracts with larger growers.
10
The point of this story is not that contract farming cannot work, but that it belongs to the class
of second best ways to organize agricultural production. While farming contracts and other forms of
partnership and cooperation can help mitigate some of the disadvantages small holders face as
completely independent producers, it would be incorrect to assume that farming contracts can
unconditionally be expected to render small-scale, family labor farms as the competitively dominant
mode of producing. In summary, as diagram 1 shows, contractual devices may reshape the relation
between operational farm size and economic returns.
9. Thus, as we will see below, even contract farmers may vigorously pursue self-insurance strategies in a way that re-
duces their competitive position in land markets.
10. The same problem has confronted the famous 4 Piños cooperative, which has been so successful at integrating
smallholders into agro-export production. At the root of the problem for both the cooperative and the export firms are the
fixed costs of information discussed in section 3.1.13
3.3 SHORT-TERM EFFECTS OF AGRO-EXPORT GROWTH: ADOPTION
AND EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
It is now possible to use the discussions in sections 3.1 and 3.2 to assemble a conceptual
framework that links the adoption, labor-absorption, and land-access effects of export growth.
For illustrative purposes,
" figure la displays the sorts of relationship that would be expected
between labor absorbed per hectare and size of operational farm unit. The curves are downward
sloping for both traditional and export crops, reflecting the expectation that smaller farms will
produce any particular crop with greater labor intensity than will larger operational units.
12 In
addition, for each farm size the export crop is presumed to be more labor-intensive. For
instance, on a 10-hectare farm, a shift from traditional to export crops would increase labor use
20 person-days per hectare, as shown by the vertical distance labeled "A" in figure la. For a
50-hectare farm, a shift of 1 hectare to export crops would increase labor absorption by 10
person-days, distance "B" .
For a given agrarian structure (that is, for a given distribution of land across agricultural
units), information of the sort displayed in figure la could be used to calculate the labor-
absorption impacts of an export cropping boom under a variety of actual and counterfactual
assumptions about export crop-adoption patterns. Intensive adoption by small operational units
would create very large employment effects, but holding structure constant, any adoption pattern
would have unambiguously positive indirect effects on the rural resource poor under the situation
portrayed in figure 1. Which farm units actually adopt the export crop would be expected to
depend on the relative profitability of export versus traditional production activities.
As discussed above, diagram 1 indicates how crop characteristics, interacting with the
information-constrained factor markets and mitigating contractual devices, come together to
determine the economic returns to export crops on different operational farm sizes. For any
given farm, the export crop-adoption decision depends on whether returns are higher for
traditional or for export crops. In the example displayed in figure lb, the two lower curves
represent the single-year marginal-income value of an additional hectare of land allocated to
traditional crops (At) and export crops (Ox) for farm units of different sizes. In a simple world of
homogeneous producers and size-neutral markets and technologies, these curves would be flat,
horizontal lines. However, because of the farm-size biases discussed earlier, small farms may
find the export crop relatively unremunerative to produce, as illustrated in figure lb. In this
11. The curves in figure 1 are only hypothetical and are used here to clarify the underlying issues. Later sections of this
paper will present actual estimates of these relationships for Chile, Guatemala, and Paraguay.
12. Such a relationship would be expected from a variety of theoretical perspectives (see section 3 below) and is in fact
confirmed in the empirical analysis (see section 4 and the appendices). For any given crop, large farm units are likely to
employ less labor per hectare than smaller farm units. Effective factor prices are different for large farms than for small
farms. The cost of labor, in productivity or efficiency units, is relatively low on small farms (because residual claimancy
makes family labor self-supervising), while the cost of capital tends to be relatively high. The opposite configuration holds
for larger farm units, which depend on hired labor but which are large enough to overcome the fixed costs of information,
which increase the cost of capital for smallholders. Given these differences in effective factor prices, it is not surprising that
large and small farms produce the same crop with different production techniques and labor intensities, as displayed in
figure la.14
Figure la
Export vs. Traditional Crop Labor Absorption
Traditiooai





1 0 50 Form Size, Hectares15
example, farm units below 10 hectares in size would not find it economic to adopt the agro-
export crop given the configuration of crop and market characteristics which shape economic
returns functions for export and traditional crops. Under this hypothetical scenario, the direct,
small-farm adoption and income effects of the export boom would be negligible. Moreover,
while the short-term net-employment effects would be positive, they would be less than they
would have been had small farms adopted export production. The indirect employment effects
thus are linked to the direct adoption effects.
3.4 COMPETITIVENESS REGIME AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR LAND:
LAND MARKET AND MEDIUM-TERM EFFECTS OF AGRO-EXPORT
GROWTH
The short-term effects of agro-export growth are those small-farm-participation and net-
employment effects that take place given a static distribution of land. Over time, differences in
economic returns across different-sized farms might be expected to induce structural change in
the ownership distribution of land. Any induced changes thus create the medium-term effects of
changes in land access and further net-employment effects.
Incentives for induced structural change are driven by the competitiveness regime, that is,
by the differential valuation of land by different-sized farms. In the hypothetical example in
figure lb above, farms below 10 hectares in size would assign the marginal income value to land
indicated by the A curve. The larger, export-adopting farm units would assign the land the
marginal income value shown by the AX curve. Whether and in what direction induced structural
change occurs depends on two processes:
1) how individuals capitalize their marginal income value of land into a willingness to pay, or
reservation price for land, and
2) how land markets work.
These two factors will now be discussed in turn.
3.4.1 CAPITALIZATION OF INCOME VALUE INTO A RESERVATION PRICE FOR LAND:
COMPETITIVENESS REGIME
The upper curve (labeled p) in figure lb illustrates the price for land purchase that the different-
sized farms would be willing to pay given the single-year income value of land. Assuming an infinite
planning horizon, p, the capitalized value of the expected returns from an additional unit of land, can
be written as:
p=E:(A)/[1+rr
where "t" denotes years, "A" denotes the increment in income that can be earned in year "t" when
the individual allocates an additional unit of land to the privately more remunerative of traditional or
export crops, and "r" is the rate of interest used to discount the stream of future income. The16
discounted sum given by the equation is a reservation price for land in the sense that it represents
the maximum amount the farm could pay for the unit of land without losing money.
13 If the market
price is actually below an individual s reservation price, then the individual would be made better off
purchasing the land.
As drawn in figure lb, the 50-hectare farm would have the greatest incentives and economic
capacity to absorb additional land. Both larger and smaller units might be expected to shed land to
those intermediate-sized units. Whether and how quickly they do ultimately depends on how the
land market works. Postponing that discussion momentarily, and assuming that these incentives
indeed induce structural change, then figure 1 c indicates the sort of induced structural change that
would be expected for our hypothetical example. Figure lc shows the per-year change in land as
a function of pre-boom farm size. As drawn, the middle range of farms show positive land
accumulation, while both smaller and larger units display land de-accumulation. Such a pattern of
induced structural change implies a negative land-access effect for disadvantaged groups.
Under this specification of land-market demand, individuals who are tightly constrained in
factor markets or otherwise disadvantaged will be unable to adopt export crops and will thus have
fairly low As and ps. Similarly, individuals who may adopt export cropping (because it is more
remunerative than traditional cropping) may still have relatively low A, p combinations if they are
limited in their adoption, or compelled to use an expensive production technique. This latter
characterization might apply to large farms which rely on expensive (in efficiency terms) hired labor.
Thus, the illustration in figure lb shows that p is relatively low for larger farms. It is precisely this
efficiency labor-cost advantage of family-labor farms versus larger, labor-hiring farms that underlies
theories of the economic dominance of family farms (for example, Binswanger, Deininger, and
Feder 1993; Schmitt 1992). However, as should now be apparent, a theme of this paper is that the
family-labor farms of the rural resource poor in Latin America are sufficiently small that the fixed
costs of information, which shape the way many markets work, create countervailing economic
disadvantages that potentially overwhelm their labor-cost advantage.
Carter and Mesbah (1993) and Carter and Zimmerman (1993) analyze the reservation price
for land in some detail. They note that another factor that is likely to further distort the shape of
the reservation price function is the interest rate used in the equation above to discount the
stream of future income for land. Individuals who lack access to long-run capital, or who must
pursue costly self-insurance and autarkic savings strategies, will discount the future income from
land at a higher rate than would an individual well integrated into formal financial markets. The
higher the rate of discount, the lower is the reservation price, or the closer the p curve in figure
lb is pulled down toward A. To the extent that the rural resource poor are less well integrated
13. Over an infinite horizon, Et., 1 / [1 + r]t = 1 / r . If the annual income increment is $500 and the discount rate
is 5 percent, then the reservation price would be $10,000 (500/.05). If land is then bought at a market price "p" 0f exactly
$10,000, then interests payment on a $10,000 loan to buy the land (or, alternatively, the opportunity cost of the savings tied
up in the land) would be 10,000'0.05 and would exactly equal the income increase. In this case, the individual would be
neither better nor worse off with land, and in that sense the reservation price represents the maximum amount he or she
would be willing t0 pay for land.17
into financial markets, the more likely it is that this differential discount phenomenon will make
them relatively less competitive in land markets.
3.4.2 How LAND MARKETS WORK
For any land-market competitiveness configuration (as represented by the p function in figure
lb), whether and how quickly structural change occurs depends on how the land market itself
functions. Transactions costs are a key consideration, particularly in agricultural production
where very large and very small units coexist. Transactions costs may make it very costly for
smallholders to buy a small piece of land from a much larger unit because of subdivision and
legal costs. Similarly, wealthier individuals who wish to buy large pieces of land may find it
extremely costly to consolidate a single holding out of multiple small holdings.
Such transactions costs can be sufficiently high to actually segment the land market,
meaning that the market for a small piece of land is really a different market than the market for
a large piece of land. The price of land may be different in the two markets. In addition, land-
market segmentation poses a barrier to induced structural change, whether it be a shift to large
or to small-scale farmers. Carter, Luz, and Galeano (1992) present evidence consistent with
land-market segmentation in Paraguay.
In terms of figure lc above, the actual pattern of induced structural change will thus depend
on the interaction of the competitiveness regime, represented in figure lb, with the reality of
transactions costs that may pose barriers to fundamental structural change. If structural change is
induced (as it in fact has been in the three cases of agro-export growth to be examined
momentarily), then medium-term effects of agro-export growth occur. As discussed above, a
new land distribution will generate further changes in net employment as the pattern of adoption
changes and as the pattern of employment changes from that on the pre-existing farms to that on
the newly formed farm units.
" The precise nature of these second-round effects in terms of their
impacts on the rural resource poor depends on the direction of the induced structural change.
3.5 SUMMARY: POINTS OF POLICY ENTRY
This section has thus explored the economic factors summarized in diagram 1. Implicit in much
of the discussion so far have been points where policy might influence the causal chain of events
represented in diagram 1 that shape the impact of agro-export growth on the rural resource poor.
The points of potential policy entry are:
1) facilitate those crops that are most likely to generate positive impacts on the rural resource poor;
2) address imperfections in fundamental factor markets, such as capital and risk markets, which inhibit
small-farm adoption of nontraditional export crops and ultimately render them uncompetitive;
14. The new land distributi0n c0uld also induce changes in the wage rate and other prices. Karl Kautsky (1988) and de
Janvry (1981) after him have prominently argued that changes in structure induce changes in the wage rate that tend to
reduce incentives for further structural change.18
3) address the long-run mortgage-finance problems that may constrain smallholders  ability to capitalize
a competitive advantage in production into a competitive land market advantage; and
4) address transactions costs that may prevent small farms which are competitive in the land market
from being able to purchase land from larger holdings.
After discussing the three cases of agro-export growth, this paper will return in section 5 to
discuss the efficacy of the alternative policy options.
4. AGRO-EXPORT GROWTH IN CHILE, GUATEMALA, AND PARAGUAY:
HETEROGENEOUS SECTORAL IMPACTS ON THE RURAL RESOURCE POOR
In an effort to understand the impacts of agro-export booms on the rural resource poor, a
coordinated program of primary data collection and analysis has been undertaken in Chile,
Guatemala, and Paraguay. In each country, two types of data have been collected from stratified
random samples of agricultural producers drawn from a broad size range of operating farms
units:
1) production data sufficient to identify current patterns of resource allocation, productivity, and
income, and
2) retrospective information on the land purchases, sales, rental, and other transactions needed to
identify life-cycle patterns of land access and accumulation.
Using these data, it is possible to explore the changing patterns of land access and labor
absorption in the context of the farm-level constraints and production decisions that determine
differential profitability and expansion capacity.
Figure 2 presents a qualitative summary of the research findings.
15 The horizontal axis in
figure 2 measures the employment impact of agro-export growth. Values to the left of zero
indicate decreases in total labor absorption, while positive values indicate increased labor
absorption. The vertical axis indicates changes in the land access of the rural resource poor.
Values below zero indicate that the agro-export boom induced structural change that diminished
the land access of the mass of small farmers and the rural resource poor. Positive values indicate
improved land access for the rural resource poor. Agro-export growth trajectories that move the
economy into the northeast quadrant of the figure thus represent broadly based growth
experiences that have unambiguously positive effects on rural resource-poor households.
16 In
contrast, the growth trajectories that lead to the southwest quadrant are exclusionary and have
negative sectoral consequences for the rural resource poor. Trajectories into northwest and
southeast quadrants are in general ambiguous with respect to their welfare effects on the rural
15. Interested readers are referred to the three annexes attached to this paper, which report in greater detail the findings
for each country separately. As discussed in the introduction to this paper, it should be stressed that the focus here resides
on the sectoral effects and leaves out both the macroeconomic and the intrahousehold levels that potentially modify the
welfare effects of the primary-sector-level impacts.
16. Of course, a growth boom that positively affects the rural resource poor household may have ambiguous effects on
some individuals within the household, as Katz (1992) and Carter and Katz (forthcoming) analyze in the case of the Gua-
temalan agro-export surge.19
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resource poor. A priori, a trajectory into the northwest quadrant seems very unlikely inasmuch
as it would imply a shift of land to smallholders and a decrease in labor intensity.
Displayed on figure 2 are the trajectories taken by the agro-export booms in Chile (fruit),
Guatemala (vegetables), and Paraguay (soybeans and wheat). In keeping with the discussion in
section 2, each country s experience is broken up into short- and medium-term effects. The
illustrated trajectories are approximate or qualitative summaries of the quantitative estimates
reported in the annexes. Immediately striking in figure 2 is the heterogeneity of the three agro-
export experiences. Subject to caveats to be described momentarily, the Paraguayan experience
appears highly exclusionary, the Guatemalan very broadly based, and the Chilean boom
ambiguous, with diminished small-farm land access but employment increases. While frustrating
for those in search of simple lessons and policy rules, this heterogeneity signals the potential
existence of space for policy to have a real effect on the nature of agro-export growth.
Following a brief description of each country s experience, the next section will return to the
question of policy choices and design.
4.1 EXCLUSIONARY GROWTH IN PARAGUAY
The rapid growth of soy and wheat export production along Paraguay s frontier with Brazil has
taken place on large, highly mechanized farms, creating the exclusionary trajectory shown in figure
2. The relationship between the number of labor days absorbed per hectare and operational size of
farms, estimated for a sample of producers in the region, shows that labor absorption falls sharply as
operational farm size increases, from 150 labor-days/hectare to 30 labor-days/hectare as one moves
a unit of land from a 5-hectare to a 100-hectare farm. Given this sharp difference in choice of
technique between small and large farms, any structural change that shifts land from the small- to
the large-farm sector will have severely negative labor-absorption effects. Yet, over time, it has been
precisely these large farms that have increased in numbers and come to dominate the agrarian
structure of the region.
Carter, Luz, and Galeano (1992) have estimated the marginal economic value of land for farms
of different sizes, controlling for labor, machinery, and animal stock (see annex C for details).
Unlike other regions of Paraguay, where the marginal value of land slopes downward as a function
of farm size, the estimated economic value of 1 hectare of additional land in the frontier region
increases by a factor of 10 as farm size increases from 10 to 100 hectares. Even without considering
the biases against small farms in the land sales markets (see Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder
1993), this estimate of the relationship between farm size and land-value function points to a strong
competitive disadvantage for small farmers in this export-boom region. Not surprisingly, estimates
of land accumulation over time have shown (as detailed in annex C) that larger farm units are
accumulating land rapidly—on average, at a rate of nearly 20 hectares per year. 1
7This pattern of
unequal land accumulation is visible in the national agricultural census figures discussed by Galeano
17. Smaller farm units are also estimated to modestly accumulate land over their life cycle. It should be stressed that the
estimates presented in annex C come from data with a severe sample-selection problem in the sense that only those farm
units that actually survived the competitive reallocation process made it into the sample.21
(1992), which show that the percent of land in large farms increased over the 1980-1990 period in
this boom region.
The microeconomics of production in the frontier region of Paraguay thus create the
foundation for the strongly exclusionary growth trajectory hypothesized by Galeano (1992). Larger
farm units are much more competitive than small farms in terms of their marginal land evaluation.
At the same time, the farm-size differentiated patterns of labor absorption indicate severe declines in
labor demand as land competitively shifts from small to large units.
Why has growth in this agro-export boom taken this exclusionary form? Paraguayan
smallholders are highly capital constrained (Carter, Luz, and Galeano 1992), a factor that makes
their direct participation in working-capital-intensive export production difficult. Small farms enjoy
privileged access to cheap-efficiency labor, and larger units—particularly the much better capitalized
immigrant Brazilian farmers who were attracted by the region s very low land prices—enjoy
privileged access to capital.
18 While recent economic theory of agrarian growth suggests that in
general it is not possible to say which of these countervailing privileges will dominate (Carter and
Zimmerman 1993), evidence on the rapid land accumulation of large farmers leaves no doubt that
capital access advantage dominates in the case of Paraguayan wheat-soy growth boom.
The nature of the pre-boom land distribution in the frontier region also helps to explain the
exclusionary character of the boom. Unlike the long-settled, core minfindia regions of Paraguay,
settlement in the frontier region took place through colonization projects, which typically endowed
smallholders with 20-hectare plots. Land in this region was thus not highly fragmented, and yet
much of that land was assigned in blocks too large for smallholders  ability to capitalize and
effectively use. The land market in this area was probably not held up by the sorts of transactions
costs that would have been the case in a traditional min ndia area.
To summarize, a microeconomic reality of unequal, size-differentiated capital constraints
underlies the exclusionary, socially problematic export boom in Paraguay. Some smallholders have
been out-competed in the land market by large farms; others have simply sold out. While there is no
reason to question the private rationality of these decisions, the systematic shift in agrarian structure
has created externality effects on the minifundia sector as more and more resources have been
shifted to less labor-absorbing forms of production. Unfortunately, as the history of Latin
American—especially Central American—agriculture shows, this exclusionary experience is far
from being a special case (Williams 1986; Brockett 1988; and Grindle 1986).
18. Sen (1981) stresses that large farms often circumvent their high-efficiency cost 0f labor by employing machinery. In
this region of Paraguay, mechanization may also help circumvent problems created by the seasonality of agricultural labor
demand.22
4.2 BROADLY BASED GROWTH IN GUATEMALA
The highland Guatemalan experience stands in sharp contrast with the Paraguayan phenomenon,
and indeed with the past incidence of agro-export growth on the Pacific coast of Guatemala. As
detailed in annex B, Guatemalan smallholders have, within limits, adopted production of
nontraditional export crops. While the labor intensity with which these crops are produced declines
rapidly with respect to operational farm size, both of the primary export crops (broccoli and snow
peas) are between 50 percent and 300 percent more labor intensive than the traditional activities
they displace. In addition, estimates of land accumulation over time indicate that the export boom
has induced a transfer of land from modestly larger to smaller farms. As shown in figure 2, this
induced structural change seems to intensify the labor-absorption effects as well as broaden the
direct participation of the least-well-endowed rural households in the agro-export boom.
Key features behind this more broadly based growth pattern are: (1) the very high labor
intensity of the new export crops; (2) the nature of the contractual linkages which in some instances
have helped small farmers overcome working-capital constraints; (3) the very brief gestation period
of the export crops; (4) the small farmers  ability to pursue self-insurance strategies without
compromising their access to land; and (5) a highly fragmented pre-boom land distribution which
insulated small farmers from direct competition with large-scale production units.
While the highland Guatemalan agro-export boom has been broadly based, the research
identifies three dynamic processes that temper its impact on rural resource poor households. First,
as the annex details, the labor-absorption effects have been relatively muted by smallholders 
reluctance to devote more than 0.5 hectare of land to the labor-intensive export crops. Simulation of
the longer-term labor-absorption effects thus shows that the total employment growth is unlikely to
rise above a modest 15 percent.
The pattern of limited adoption itself seems to be explained by the limited ability of
smallholders to capitalize and bear the risk of larger extensions of the export crops. It is striking that
small-farm financial-market constraints appear so pervasive even in a region where these farms have
adopted boom crops and done well in the short and medium term. Unfortunately, these constraints
caution about the prospects for a second dynamic (long-term structural change), which could
undermine broadly based growth. As shown in annex B, at farm sizes in excess of 10 hectares, area
devoted to agro-export crops climbs sharply. A complementary, but non-random, sample of larger
producers (30–200 hectares in size) in the highland area identified a class of producers who devote
100 percent of their cropped area to the export crops. This same subsample has also been
accumulating land at a very rapid rate. Analysis of this subsample is as yet incomplete. However, as
shown in annex B, the labor intensity of production falls off sharply even as farm size increases,
modestly over the 1–4-hectare range. It therefore seems likely that a longer-term shift of land to this
class of seemingly well-capitalized and insured producers would undercut both land-access and
employment-generation aspects of the export boom.23
Finally, increasing problems with pesticide residues threaten to introduce a third dynamic into
the evolution of the sector. At the international market level, exporters bear the risk that crops will
be rejected for high pesticide-residue levels. One Guatemalan export firm declared its intention to
contract only with larger-scale producers who could be monitored on a cost-effective basis.
While the research reported in annex B does not reveal any systematic evidence that these new
dynamics have fundamentally impinged on the broadly based characteristic of the Guatemalan
export growth process, they signal the sorts of microeconomic constraints that might tilt the
competitive advantage of export crop production away from small farmers.
4.3 AMBIGUOUS GROWTH IN CHILE
Figure 2 displays the Chilean fruit-boom growth trajectories as heading into the southeast quadrant,
with positive employment effects but negative land-access effects. Our experiences in the field
confirm that fruit crops appear to be more labor absorbing than traditional field crops at any given
scale of cultivation, though we lack data on larger-scale nonfruit cultivation in some areas. Medium-
term labor-absorption effects, irrespective of the adoption pattern, are thus positive, as shown in
figure 2.
Adoption of fruit cultivation is strongly skewed toward larger, better capitalized holders. Our
sample shows that very few smallholders, whether min/indistas or recipients of the more
generously sized agrarian-reform parcels, have participated in the fruit boom as direct producers.
Several key characteristics appear to generate this "farm-size bias" in fruit production. Large initial
investments with long gestation periods and large amounts of working capital needed for the
standardized production and packaging of export crops create a bias against smallholders to the
extent that they are disadvantaged in capital markets. Smallholders also lack the entrepreneurial
ability to deal with institutions, such as banks and export firms, involved in export production.
Finally, export firms, which often supply credit to producers, are not greatly interested in working
with small farmers, who are thought to be greater risks and cause higher transaction costs.
19 Even in
the southern part of the Central Valley, where the production for export of shorter-cycle crops such
as asparagus and raspberries is taking off, smallholders have found it difficult to participate in that
market for reasons of both capital access and risk management.
20
While the differential adoption of export crops by medium and large farmers versus
smallholders would be expected to create strong incentives for structural change in land access, the
rapidity which the fruit boom has induced a restructuring of land access is remarkable. As detailed in
annex A, land structure has become increasingly polarized, with some holdings selling land to larger,
more capitalized (in both human and financial terms) individuals and retreating to smaller
19.Many export farms establish a minimum size for the fruit orchards with which they will transact.
20. When a small group of land-reform parcel beneficiaries was able, with the help of bank credit negotiated through a
nongovernmental organization (NGO), to embark on a small-scale production of raspberries, lab0r-shortage and manage-
ment problems at harvest time and the marketing difficulties of a highly perishable crop eventually forced every participant
in the program to abandon the effort. Burdened by the heavy debt incurred from the project, a number of the growers were
forced to sell part of their land.24
min ndia. The net result, in the fruit-growing northern Central Valley, is a structure with more
mid-sized (12 40 BIH
21) and small (less than 8 BIH) farm units. It is this stark and rapid
restructuring that has led a number of observers (Jarvis 1989; Cox, Nino de Zepeda, and Rojas
1990; Ortega 1988) to comment on the exclusionary nature of Chile s agro-export growth
experience.
22
The employment effect of this induced structural shift preliminarily appears to be positive, as
the disappearing farm units were apparently less labor absorbing than both the smaller min ndia
and larger, better capitalized, fruit-producing farms which have replaced them. Figure 2 displays
these medium-term effects with the solid arrow heading off into the southeast quadrant.
While this southeastward direction adequately captures the experience of the northern Central
Valley where the fruit boom is most developed, newly emergent export growth in the southern part
of the Central Valley may be taking a somewhat different shape. The process of land polarization
appears even more acute in the southern part of the Central Valley, where traditional crop
agriculture and animal husbandry continue to predominate. As detailed in annex A, preliminary
estimates of labor absorption and structural change indicate that land in the south is moving toward
units that are both absolutely larger in size than the expanding units in the northern Central Valley
and possibly less labor absorbing than the units they are replacing. In the southern Central Valley,
land transactions are shifting property from land-reform parcel holders to both the 12 40 BIH farms
and to those exceeding 40 BIH. The impact of these structural shifts on labor absorption remains
unclear: 12 40 BIH farms display the lowest employment levels of all farm units while—with the
exception of the smallest farms—farms greater than 40 BIH have the highest labor-absorption level.
Further work needs to be done to untangle the marginal labor absorption of the expanding farm
units, but preliminary estimates point toward medium-term effects that move the growth path
toward the southwest in figure 2. Too much more should probably not be made of this preliminary
result at this time.
21. A basic irrigated hectare, or BIH, is a unit of land of uniform productive capacity.
22. This growth experience is not fully exclusionary by the definition used in this paper given the positive effects from
increased employment. However, the fact that the new employment generated by fruit production appears t0 be more highly
seasonal in nature adds another dimension to the problem. While total hours of labor absorbed have increased, reliance on
temporary labor use has increased substantially (Ortega 1988; Gómez and Echenique 1988). Furthermore, much of the
employment created by the expansion of fruit production is for women who did not participate in the labor market in the
past.25
5. POLICY OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING BROADLY BASED GROWTH
The impact of agro-export growth on the rural resource poor in Latin America has been
heterogeneous, ranging from highly exclusionary, which has displaced small farmers and generated
little compensatory employment increace, to broadly based, in which smallholders have participated
as direct producers and net employment expansion has been positive. This heterogeneity
characterizes even the so-called nontraditional export products. Indeed, the case of nontraditional
vegetable exports from highland Guatemala (section 4.2, above, and annex B) is one of the few
contemporary Latin American nontraditional export booms that has primarily rested upon small-
farm production.
From a policy perspective, the heterogeneity of agro-export growth belies any presumption
that promotion of nontraditionals will necessarily engender broadly based growth. "Nontraditional
exports" is not an incantation which automatically links agrarian growth and rural poverty
reduction. The experience of the Chilean fruit boom (section 4.3 and annex A) is instructive in this
regard. While not as broadly based as export growth in highland Guatemala, Chile s sustained
export boom generated much more employment than, say, the highly exclusionary growth trajectory
along Paraguay s frontier with Brazil (section 4.1 and annex C). Nonetheless, Chile s intermediate
growth trajectory generated political demands for policy to broaden the base of agricultural growth,
demands which gained voice following the redemocratization of the Chilean polity (see Carter and
Mesbah 1993, and the citations therein). Figures on the doubling of rural poverty in Chile over the
1970–1987 period of rapid agro-export growth (CEPAL 1991) buttress the perception that
nontraditional export growth—even of the intermediate Chilean style—is not synonymous with
broadly based growth.
While agro-exports booms and broadly based growth are not synonymous, neither are they
antonymous. The heterogeneous impact of ago-export booms on the rural resource poor also
suggests that there is space for policy to broaden the base of that growth. Diagram 1 (p. 7, above)
identified a number of potential entry points for policy interested in broadening the base of ago-
export growth. Diagram 2 reorganizes those policy points into a continuum of policy options
ranging from least to most activist. Short of asset redistribution, the major groupings along the
continuum are as follows:26
Level 1 getting prices and institutions "right";
Level 2 picking winners for public investment;
Level 3 land market reform; and
Level 4 reform of information-constrained markets.
These four groups are a subset of the full range of agricultural policies which stretches from laissez
faire to centrally planned, dirigista regimes. All four are consistent with reliance on nondistorted,
price-making markets and decentralized decision-making. They are all potentially relevant to the
direct effects of ago-export growth on the rural resource poor, namely, the small-farm adoption
and land-access effects. Subsequent discussion will focus on which of these policies is likely to
work.
While the nature of these direct effects shapes the buoyancy of ago-export employment gen-
eration, the policy map becomes greatly simplified if we eschew any effort to have positive direct
effects on the rural resource poor. In this case, policy would need only to (1) get prices right (avoid
Laissez faire
Prices and institutions "right"
a. Nondistorted price signals
b. Secure property rights to enhance investment incentives
DIAGRAM 2 Continuum of policies for achieving broadly based growth
2. Picking winners for public investment
a. Agronomic and commercial constraints
b. Technical indeterminacy
3. Land market reform
a. Land taxation
b. Land banks to eliminate transactions costs and market segmentation
c. Mortgage banks to provide long-run finance
4. Reform of information-constrained markets
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artificially cheapening capital), (2) make a good-faith effort to pick labor-absorbing commodities,
and (3) assure that tenure rights are secure and marketable so that markets can move the land to
those who can adopt export crops.
The danger in such a policy is that it may engender a persistent drift over time to increased land
concentration, decreased labor absorption, and increased inequality in income distribution. Thus,
while a noninterventionist policy approach may suffice to realize agro-export growth, the social
stability of such growth is questionable. More sustainable, broadly based growth may require posi-
tive direct effects and more activist policies to bring them about. It is necessary, therefore, to get a
handle on the small-farm competitiveness factors that shape the adoption and land-access effects of
agro-export growth.
This section offers a broad-ranging evaluation of the policy continuum for assisting the rural
resource poor, drawing on the evidence and theoretical organization of prior sections. The chief
conclusion that emerges ís that level 4 policíes must be part of a broadly based agro-export growth
strategy. The next four subsections take apart each policy group in turn, evaluating the contribution
each has to make to realizing a "broadly based" growth process.
5.1 GETTING PRICES AND INSTITUTIONS
"RIGHT
" : MINIMALIST POLICY,
BUT IT TAKES MORE THAN FREE MARKETS
A policy package that eliminated price distortions, which favor large farmers (for example, capital
subsidies), and that legally solidified the property rights of small farmers (for example, land titling)
would constitute a minimalist approach to achieving broadly based growth. Historically, price dis-
tortions have played an important part in enhancing the relative competitiveness of larger farm units
in Latin America. Indeed, some authors argue that elimination of such distortions suffices to create
poverty-reducing agrarian-growth trajectories (de Janvry and Sadoulet 1993; Binswanger, Dein-
inger, and Feder 1993).
While there is no doubt that elimination of price distortions that favor large farms and discour-
age labor-intensive forms of production is important, the contemporary experience of ago-export
growth strongly suggests that simply
"getting prices right
" is insufficient to generate broadly based
growth. Both that experience (see section 4) and the economic theory of information (see section 3)
suggest that there are intrinsic market imperfections that hamper small-farm competitiveness and
create exclusionary growth trajectories. This is especially the case for markets characterized by a
highly dualistic distribution of landownership.
Because smallholders often lack legally well-defined property rights to land, policies such as
land titling constitute a second component of a minimalist policy approach. Provision of land titles
thus appears attractive as a way to provide institutional preconditions for broadly based growth.
However, three observations question the necessity for "getting property rights right" as a precon-
dition for broadly based growth:28
1. Current smallholders may already have localized, but nontransferable, tenure security.
23
2. While land titling may make localized tenure security transferable (and thus valuable as a collateral), this
may not by itself suffice to improve the capital access of current smallholders.
24
3. Making tenure security transferable may have its largest impact by enhancing the marketability of
smallholder land to other, better capitalized fanners.
Observations (1) and (2) suggest that a careful look be given to the nature of localized tenure se-
curity and the nature of the financial system before land titling is pursued as a device to enhance the
direct participation of small farmers in a growth process.
Observation (3) indicates that when the existing distribution of land constrains the adoption of
high-growth-potential crops—as it would if current landholders cannot capitalize the new crop pro-
duction—titling and land market activation may speed the displacement of current smallholders.
While such policies may be very important in activating agrarian growth, they may mitigate the ob-
jective of broadly based growth. This may well be the lesson from the Chilean experience. Once
smallholder land titles were made fully secure and transferable by the Pinochet government, land
sales very rapidly shifted land to modestly larger and better capitalized units, which have been the
most successful in the production of fruits for export. The efforts of the Aylwin government in Chile
focused on implementing policies to broaden the base of that agrarian growth.
In summary, while a policy of getting prices and institutions right is attractive in the sense that
it is relatively straightforward and consistent with the general tenor of a market-oriented develop-
ment strategy, the analysis here suggests that policy must progress beyond this laissez-faire level if
ago-export growth is to be broadly based.
23. While there can be no doubt that insecure property rights truncate investment incentives and therefore may dampen
smallholder competitiveness in the production of crops that require long-term investment (for example, fruit trees), it is
important to note that security of the current occupant may be very different from the security that a potential future occu-
pant would enjoy. The dismal experience of land-titling programs that expend large amounts of money to establish a land
registry only to see the registry quickly become outdated when no one bothers to record land transactions when they occur
indicates that current occupants often feel quite secure in their property rights as defined by their customary system. The
need to provide tenure security to enhance the competitiveness of current smallholders should not be taken for granted—it
is an empirical question which needs to be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
24. Land without legally clear title may offer little security and have diminished economic value to potential occupants
from outside the local social context. In this instance, land securely held by the current occupant may have relatively little
collateral value to a formal financial system. Low collateral value may thus impinge on the ability of smallholders to par-
ticipate in working-capital-intensive export production. However, the primary question remains an empirical one inasmuch
as formal financial institutions often show no interest in lending to smallholders even when the latter hold land titles, and
smallholders often find the fixed transactions costs associated with formal loans sufficiently large to discourage them from
demanding formal credit. A recent review 0f the impact of land titling programs in Latin America and the Caribbean by the
Land Tenure Center of the University of Wisconsin c0ncluded that titling, in and of itself, has not improved credit access
for smallholders (for further details, see Shearer, Lastarria-Cornhiel, and Mesbah 1991).29
5.2 PICKING WINNERS FOR PUBLIC INVESTMENT
Public investment sometimes plays a role in facilitating the growth of ago-exports through the
creation of infrastructure, identification and development of product markets, development of crop
varieties suitable to the local environment, and establishment of rural credit facilities (see Williams
1986). A modestly activist approach to creating broadly based growth would try to target public
investment on crops that are most likely to conform to the economic capacity of small farmers and
that are most likely to generate significant employment increases. In the language of the industrial
policy debate, this policy approach would try to "pick winners" by investing in those activities most
likely to generate broadly based growth.
To give an example, the broadly based nature of the growth path generated by the agro-export
boom in highland Guatemala appears to be explicable in terms of the extreme labor intensity and
short gestation period of the exported specialty vegetable crops. The less broadly based agro-export
boom in Chilean fruit would seem to be explained by the fact that the long investment gestation pe-
riod of fruit trees (five years) militates against smallholder production in a way that the short-cycle
Guatemalan vegetable crops (three months) do not.
However, there are two questions that confront the effectiveness of a "picking winners" ap-
proach to broadly based growth. The first is a technical question: Do agronomic and commercial
realities grant policy any degrees of freedom to choose among alternative export crops? The second
is an economic question: Can alternative crops be unconditionally and meaningfully ranked in terms
of their potential for generating broadly based growth?
Section 3 argued that most crops are technically scale neutral—that it is the structure of mar-
kets and prices that twists crop characteristics into farm-size biases. While the Guatemalan agro-
export growth trajectory testifies to the importance of technical crop characteristics, these character-
istics alone cannot explain the broadly based nature of growth in highland Guatemala. The broadly
based growth of highland Guatemala (in which smallholders cautiously adopted export crops and
maintained their land access despite severe capital constraints) cannot be understood apart from the
fragmented nature of landholdings in highland Guatemala. The pre-existing land-distribution and
transactions-costs barriers to land consolidation, in other words, could play an important role in ex-
plaining the more inclusionary Guatemalan growth path. In a different land-market environment, the
Guatemalan boom crops may have created a much less broadly based pattern of growth. Had the
capital-constrained and cautious highland Guatemalan producers been located in Chile s Central
Valley, with legal and easily transferrable title, the nature of the export boom might have been quite
different.
The partial nature of crop characteristics as a determinant of the impact of agro-export growth
on the rural resource poor is highlighted by the Paraguayan experience. The field crops (wheat and
soy) that form the basis for the Paraguayan boom are surely quite scale neutral. Yet, it has been the
boom in precisely these indeterminate crops that has taken a most exclusionary form, as the discus-
sion in section 4 indicated.30
The conclusion to be drawn from this is not that crop characteristics are unimportant in shap-
ing the impact of an agro-export boom on the rural resource poor. There are some crops that are
more labor intensive than others, and, as such, they offer advantageous direct and indirect effects.
But policy interested in shaping broadly based ago-export growth cannot afford to think about
crop characteristics in isolation from the factor-market structures that shape who eventually grows
the crops and how they get grown. There are few crops that cannot be grown on large farms, and
most crops, when grown on large farms, are gown with much less labor intensity than they are
grown on small farms. In the end, a policy focus on "picking winners" means carefully thinking
through those crops and crop characteristics in the context of existing market and agrarian struc-
tures. Crops that seem intrinsically labor intensive and size neutral may well turn out not to be if
capital, insurance, and output quality factors are skewed against small-scale producers. This would
imply that a policy approach that gave up on direct participation by small-scale producers would
also be likely to generate less labor absorption than might have otherwise been obtained. While pub-
lic investment in agro-export promotion implies a responsibility to consider the nature of the growth
it will engender, it is not a consideration that can take place in isolation from the level 4, activist
policies discussed below.
5.3 LAND MARKET REFORM: PERHAPS NECESSARY, BUT NOT SUF-
FICIENT FOR RURAL RESOURCE POOR
As shown in diagram 1, land market reform refers to a set of policies that directly affect either the
valuation of land itself (land taxation) or the cost of transacting in the land market. While a relatively
activist policy in microeconomic terms, land market reform is in practice fairly simple because it
does not affect the constellation of factors (access to technology, capital, labor, and so on) that
determine productive returns to land and that in turn affect the land market indirectly. Small-farm
technology and extension policies can, of course, be implemented as a potential complement to
land-market reform policies, as has happened recently in Chile.
The menu of land market reform measures are:
1. Land taxati0n. Taxation with progressively higher rates as size of ownership holding increases has been
argued to provide large landowners with the incentive to sell part of their land in order to escape the
higher tax rates (Strasma el al. 1987). This market reform measure is anticipated to increase the amount
of land available for purchase by different strata of producers.
2. Mortgage banks. The majority of the landless and the land-poor do not have the savings or access to the
financial resources necessary to convert an economic desire to own land into effective demand. Modeled
on successful farmland mortgage systems in industrialized countries, mortgage banks make loans to
individual peasants, or groups of peasants, to finance the purchase of land. By providing the landless and
land-poor with the long-term loans required for farmland purchases, these land-financing systems are
expected to increase their participation in the land market and enhance their bargaining position.
3. Land banks. Because transactions costs may make large owners reluctant to subdivide their properties
into the small lots appropriate for purchase by smallholders, mortgage banks supplying credit for land
purchases may be ineffective. Land banks, on the other hand, purchase large estates, which they then
subdivide into family-sized farm units and resell to landless and land-poor families. By assuming the31
transaction costs involved in the breakup of large holdings into small units that the poor could purchase,
land banks are hypothesized to improve the latter
 s access to these lands.
The expectation that these land-market reform policies can reverse the observed pattern of land
market transactions and shift land to the resource poor relies on the presumption that the resource-
poor do not suffer a fundamental competitive disadvantage in the sphere of production that affects
their potential for participating in the land market. If such a large "competitiveness gap" exists, then
neither politically feasible progressive land taxation nor putting the resource poor on an equal
transactions-cost or mortgage-capital basis with the better-off will achieve the desired redistributive
effect. They will still be unable to earn sufficient returns to justify paying the market price for the
land.
There is no evidence in contemporary Latin America of land market reforms having
fundamentally altered patterns of landownership. Pilot programs such as the Penny Foundation
project in Guatemala and the land-purchase financing program of the Honduran Central Bank—in
which farms were purchased and subsequently resold under competitive market terms—have had a
very limited impact due to the shortage of funds available.
25 Moreover, in Guatemala, case studies
of Penny Foundation farms have shown that the typical smallholder beneficiaries may not be able to
generate enough income to repay their land-purchase loans, forcing them to abandon their parcels.
Studies on both the Guatemalan and Honduran land-purchase financing programs have also shown
that the households most likely to survive the first years on the farms had savings to support their
subsistence or other adults in the household who could contribute to family income with off-farm
employment (Shearer, Lastarria-Cornhiel, and Mesbah 1991).
While both the Chilean and Paraguayan growth trajectories have seen the concentration of
growth in larger operational units, the experience of neither country suggests that the arsenal of land
market reforms could have reshaped growth. In both the Chilean Central Valley and the Paraguayan
frontier with Brazil, smaller units already controlled significant amounts of land prior to the export
boom. Land-market transactions costs or mortgage finance problems thus did not deter the entry of
smaller-scale producers into the boom sector. Indeed, estimates from the frontier region of
Paraguay indicate that, net of transaction costs and mortgage finance considerations, small farms are
simply not competitive with larger units given the current configuration of prices and markets.
Thus, we are left with a policy package that could be a necessary part of breaking up the
dualistic agrarian structure, which is so pervasive in Latin America, but will not be sufficient unless
it is part of a broader package that addresses the concerns regarding scale-biased markets raised
above and discussed further in section 5.4.
In summary, while work such as Carter, Luz, and Galeano (1992) identifies strong
segmentation in land markets (where smaller units compete in a different land market segment, with
25. Lending institutions in the developing countries must rely on depositors and international donors to raise funds for
land-purchase financing. Unless these instituti0ns dispose of very large quantities of capital, their land-purchase funds will
deplete very rapidly—after only a few land purchases—leaving them unable to finance any more transactions until those
funds are replenished by borrowers (Shearer, Lastarria-Cornhiel, and Mesbah 1991).32
higher prices, than do large farms), there is relatively little evidence to date to suggest that the
nature of the land market per se has inhibited the realization of broadly based growth patterns.
5.4 CLOSING THE COMPETITIVENESS GAP WITH FACTOR MARKET
REFORM: CAPITAL-INSURANCE NEXUS
Policies to facilitate small-farm competitiveness and land access are vital if agro-export growth is to
have positive direct effects on the rural resource poor. Among the various factors that create farm-
size competitiveness biases, the only one that unambiguously favors small farms is their access to
relatively cheap labor (or, more precisely, cheap "interactive labor," in the language of section 3).
The observation that cheap labor is the small-farm sector s only advantage is not meant to denigrate
its potential importance. Nor does this observation deny the broad historical drift to family-labor
agriculture that has characterized the economic development of now wealthier countries. However,
in the context of the capital, risk, and quality requirements of export agriculture (see section 3.1
above), it is important to keep in mind the sharp difference in the absolute size of, say, a North
American family farm and a Latin American peasant producer.
Access to cheap and well-motivated interactive family labor may indeed provide the decisive
competitive advantage for a 100-hectare family-labor farm versus a 1,000-hectare wage-labor or
collective farm. Both the 100- and the 1,000-hectare farms are large enough that the fixed costs of
information which shape various input and output markets are irrelevant. Family farms in North
America are more than large enough to deal with these information costs. The same can also be said
of many of the emergent mid-sized or capitalized family farms observed to exist in central Chile and
elsewhere in Latin America (see especially Scott 1985; and Lehmann 1986).
26 However, the same
cannot be said about the 1- or 2-hectare family-labor farms in Latin America. For such farms, two
orders of magnitude smaller than family farms elsewhere, the labor-cost advantage may not suffice
to overcome countervailing competitive disadvantages created by the size-sensitive factor and
output markets discussed earlier.
It is exceedingly important to put this last comment in context. Clearly, many East and
Southeast Asian economies have developed vital, competitive agricultures based on very small
family-labor farms. Yet, they have done so in structural contexts where small farms do not compete
head-to-head with farms two, three, and four orders of magnitude larger, as do small farms in Latin
America.
27 Carter and Zimmerman (1993) theoretically explore why an East Asian farm structure is
likely to engender economically endogenous price reactions which enhance the long-run
competitiveness of small farms while a prototypical Latin American distribution will not. A political
economy perspective on the effective political demand for small-farm services would complement
this contention regarding the self-ratifying competitiveness of small farms when the initial land
distribution is unimodal.
26. Note that Lehmann (1986) himself indicates that growth along the capitalized family-farm path may be even more
completely proletarianizing than traditional Latin American bimodal patterns of growth.
27. Postwar land reforms in Fast Asia established tight landownership ceilings of 2.5-3 hectares.33
The agro-export growth experience in highland Guatemala highlights the importance of both
structural-context and capital-market disadvantages of small farms. The analysis in annex B
identifies capital and risk constraints as key factors behind the limited extent of ago-export
adoption by smallholders—an aspect of small-farm behavior that stands in marked contrast to the
relatively few larger-scale producers of the same crops. In a complementary analysis of the same
agro-export sector, von Braun, Hotchkiss, and Immink (1989) estimate that small farmers substitute
for their lack of access to insurance and capital markets by allocating their resources according to a
self-insurance strategy that is economically quite costly. Both of these analyses highlight the
continuing presence of binding capital constraints that dampen the competitiveness of small-scale
producers, even given the existence of contract farming and cooperatives, which partially mitigates
the size disadvantages of small farms. The persistence and growth of small farms despite their
revealed competitive disadvantage is strong testimony to the importance of the initial structural
context in which growth occurs. As argued earlier, the pre-existing fragmentation and heterogeneity
of land in highland Guatemala presents a real barrier to the creation of larger-scale farms. In a sense,
the structure of highland Guatemala approximates an East Asian land distribution in which there is
relatively little short-run competition from larger farm units.
28
The same small-farm capital-access problems are evident in the agro-export boom sectors of
Chile and Paraguay. But, as reviewed earlier, the structural outcome has been quite different with
very rapid land concentration accompanying the export booms. Interestingly, one of the changes
initiated by Chile s elected Christian Democratic government in 1990 was a massive expansion of
small-farm credit and technical-assistance programs in an effort to broaden the base of what was
perceived as a highly exclusionary growth process. Yet, even as these credit programs provide more
working capital for smallholders, they have not addressed the risk and insurance problems of these
same producers. Like the Guatemalan small farmers, Chilean minyindistas can and do allocate their
resources in a way consistent with self-insurance. However, in the highly competitive boom land
market of Chile, such conservative strategies are unlikely to generate the returns necessary to be
competitive in the land market.
From a policy perspective, then, two very clear messages emerge if the agrarian-structure and
labor-absorption picture of agro-export expansion is to avoid the southwestwardly drift described
above in figure 2:
1. Small farmers will need improved access to both ex-ante and ex-post capital or, in other words, financial
assistance to capitalize into agro-export activities and to insure themselves against stochastic shocks to
their production and prices. They may also need help overcoming major informational costs that might
be associated with the adoption of new agro-exports or the weak bargaining position of being an
individual small grower interacting with large-scale processors or powerful input suppliers.
2. Policy can get away with doing less when structural competition is less severe.
28. Yet, even in Guatemala, there is some evidence of an evolving dynamic that will markedly reduce the competitive-
ness of small farmers. See the earlier discussion on pesticide residue problems and market revaluation of the optimal op-
erational size34
Unfortunately, rectifying the capital- and insurance-market disadvantages of small-scale
producers is not simple, as the dismal experience with targeted credit and crop insurance programs
demonstrate. The transactions costs, informational asymmetries, and weak collateral base that
disadvantage smallholders in competitive markets represent real economic problems. While
programs like credit unions (which reduce transactions costs and exploit informal, local information)
and Grameen Bank-like group-lending schemes (which reduce lender risk and substitute peer
monitoring for collateral) are promising efforts to address the underlying problems, their generalized
effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated, especially in agricultural settings where covariate risk is
high.
6. BRINGING ACTIVIST POLICY BACK IN FOR BROADLY BASED GROWTH
Diagram 2, introduced in the preceding section, offers a continuum of possible agricultural policies.
Over the past decade, policy has swung strongly toward the laissez-faire end of that continuum. The
contemporary experience of agricultural liberalization and nontraditional agro-export promotion is
heterogeneous and cautions against the presumption that agrarian growth free of capital subsidies
and policy distortions will be broadly based. Farm-level constraints often make effective or shadow
prices size-sensitive in these markets, meaning that real economic costs and returns are
systematically different for farm units of different size. When shadow prices are size sensitive, there
is a danger that growth will be spread thinly across the agrarian structure, resulting in a growth
trajectory that is not broadly based and that potentially induces a socially destructive structural
dynamic in the longer run.
The standard, microeconomically quietist, liberalization package of right prices, right
institutions, and macro stability may not suffice to include the poor in agrarian growth. Indeed,
efforts such as land titling may serve only to generalize and make marketable to outsiders what had
been locally secure, smallholder tenure. Perhaps useful to get growth moving, such efforts are as
likely to work by moving smallholders out as by including them in.
The difficulty of incorporating the rural resource poor directly in an agro-export boom can be
traced to the fact that there are a number of characteristics of export crops (working capital
intensity, human capital intensity, risk and product quality standards) which are affected by the fixed
costs of information that shape fundamental factor and financial markets. Given these fixed
information costs, market-driven solutions rarely suffice to incorporate small-scale holders into the
process, at least not when a larger-scale sector exists as an alternative. Small farms are not
competitive. It is thus not surprising that small farms are left out of the export boom unless policy
steps forward to address the information-costs problems that underlies this fundamental
competitiveness gap.
Achievement of broadly based growth requires bringing microeconomically more activist
policy back in. In terms of the policy continuum in diagram 2, the message is to avoid the market-
unfriendly extreme of dirigista policy and to seek intermediate policy ground, which appears35
necessary to achieve effective and socially sustainable growth and development. An intermediate
policy strategy mandates that states, nongovernmental organizations, and other extra-market
agencies necessarily have large roles to play in overcoming the microeconomic obstacles that
liberalization alone cannot surmount. Assuredly, these are not the centralized roles of an earlier era,
when many believed that states could quickly address the challenges facing low-income economies.
But, in recent years, many liberalization advocates have promised no less a quick fix. What is
needed is less disinvestment in the state and more investment in the markets that are essential to
sustainable and equitable growth in low-income agriculture.
However important, addressing these fundamental factor-market problems is not easy to do, as
the dismal experience of targeted credit displays. Peter Timmer (1988–89) remarks that agricultural
policymaking becomes "analytically taxing" once one acknowledges the imperfections of rural
markets. People-friendly (but not market-naive) liberalization must address the challenges of
missing, thin, and size-sensitive markets if low-income agrarian economies are to follow paths of
sustainable development with equity.37
ANNEX A
Chile s fruit-export boom
and its impact on the employment opportunities
and land access of the resource poor
A-1 BACKGROUND
In the face of stagnating agricultural growth in the mid-1960s, the Frei administration (1964—1973)
embarked Chile on one of the most ambitious land reform programs in Latin America. The agrarian
reform, extended and intensified by the Allende administration (1970-1973), expropriated 43 percent of
the agricultural land in the country (in quality-adjusted terms). The land reform was abruptly curtailed
by a military coup in 1973 and reformed sector land was returned to the private sector. After restoring
30 percent of the land originally expropriated to its former owners, the military gradually allocated most
of the remaining land in the reformed sector to individual beneficiaries as private plots or parcelas.
Upon the completion of the process of parcelation in 1979, 48,000 families had received plots of land
averaging 10 BIH ("basic irrigated hectares").
From 1973 onward, the military also implemented a sequence of neoliberal, market-oriented,
agricultural policies, seeking the greater insertion of Chile s agricultural products into the international
market. Agricultural and forestry exports were greatly promoted. As a result, total area under fruit
cultivation nearly tripled in the period 1974-1990, and the current dollar value of the agroforestry
exports in 1990 was more than ten times as large as that of 1974. This sustained agro-export growth is
the success story of the neoliberal economic strategy and has garnered widespread admiration for the
Chilean policy model.
Chile
 s experience in the wake of agrarian reform parcelation provides a quasi-experimental
opportunity to study the impact of rapid agro-export growth on the agrarian structure and labor
employment. To address these important issues, this annex uses survey data gathered in 1991—1992
from a sample of 207 original parceleros in two regionally distinct economic environments: one where
the production of fruit for export has been booming (the province of Cachapoal), and one where the
production of traditional domestic market crops is still dominant (the province of uble ).
A-2 ADOPTION OF EXPORT CROPS
Shifting production to fruit plantations and forestry is a long-term process that requires large initial
capital investments with no returns over a long gestation period. Export crops also require standardized
production and packaging, necessitating large quantities of working capital and access to additional
investment funds. Although exporter credit was available for such production in Chile, most
smallholders and parceleros could not borrow. They were also inexperienced in fruit production and
lacked the entrepreneurial ability and familiarity with the institutional framework (banks, technical
agents, export firms, and so forth) that are necessary to produce successfully for the export market38
(Jarvis 1989). The lack of capital access and the absence of well-organized marketing and processing
cooperatives impeded the participation of small farmers and parceleros in the export market.
CIREN s (1990, 1991) data on fruit producers for both Cachapoal and Ruble regions clearly
reveal the low adoption rate of export crops by small farmers (see table A-1). In the Cachapoal region,
where the production of fruit is widespread (covering 40 percent of the agricultural land), farms in the
0-5-hectare size category represent 57 percent of all agricultural units but only 16.2 percent of fruit
growers. On the other hand, farms greater than 20 hectares—representing 14 percent of all the
agricultural units in the province—make up 42.6 percent of fruit growers. In Ruble, 47.5 percent of
agricultural units fall into the 0-5-hectare farm-size category. Yet, this category represents only 14.80
percent of fruit producers in that province compared to 62.3 percent of fruit growers who own farms
greater than 20 hectares.
1 Fruit production is more prominent among the larger producers of either
region.
A-3 EFFECTS OF ADOPTION ON THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURE
Not only were small farmers and parceleros generally unable to participate in the export boom, but the
production of the traditional crops they most commonly produced for the domestic market became
increasingly less profitable between 1973 and the severe economic and agricultural crisis of 1982/1983.
Meanwhile, the fruit boom created a strong demand for high-quality parcelero land from those
individuals with sufficient financial resources—including easier access to credit—to participate in that
market. "Squeezed economically, on the one hand, and offered high prices for land, on the other, many
parceleros chose to sell out" (Jarvis 1989, p. 242).
The number of parcel sales in the brief period since 1973 has been staggering. Available data
suggest that a growing number of land reform assignees have sold their land. ICIRA s 1979 study
indicated that about 15 percent of the land reform assignees had sold their land as early as June 1978.
Rough estimates suggest that at least 30 percent of the parcelas had been sold by December 1979
(Jarvis 1981) and about 40 percent by the end of 1986 (Gómez and Echenique 1988). A recent study on
parcelero land sales estimates that at the national level, 57 percent of the original 48,000 beneficiaries
sold their land (Echenique and Rolando 1991).
Determining the impact of these transactions on the overall agrarian structure has been hampered
by the lack of an agricultural census. Jarvis (1989) estimates that by 1986, land sales had increased the
proportion of area in the large-farm sector from the 20 percent it constituted following the privatization
of reformed sector land by the military to approximately 25-30 percent.
For the purposes of a study of the evolution of agrarian structure, we selected a sample of 13 ex-
haciendas (or large estates) 6 in Cachapoal Province and 7 in Ruble Province—originally surveyed in
a 1965 ICIRA-LTC study of large estates in Chile s Central Valley. Figures A-1 and A-3 represent the
size distribution of the "1976 farms" created within the 1965 boundaries of our selected ex-haciendas
by private subdivisions and the agrarian reform (1965-1973) and, later, by the processes of land
restitution and parcelation (1973-1976). The list of current owners and farms sizes was then updated to
1. In the absence of a new agricultural census, the information on the distribution of agricultural properties in
Cachapoal and Ruble is based on agricultural tax rolls for 1989.39
199, with the size distributions of the new farms depicted in figures A-2 and A-4.
2 The degree of rapid
concentration of landownership that has taken place in the short period between 1976 and 1991 is
astonishing. In Cachapoal, the area controlled by farms exceeding 80 BIH has increased from about 9
percent in 1976 to 23 percent in 1991. Land sales by the land reform beneficiaries have also led to the
creation of a large number of small farms: in 1976, there were no farm units smaller than 5 BIH; by
1991, farms smaller than 5 BIH made up 21 percent of all agricultural units while accounting for less
than 2.5 percent of the land in our study. In 1976, in uble , there were no farms either smaller than 5
BIH or greater than 80 BIH. The distribution of land was relatively egalitarian with 84 percent of
agricultural units controlling 63 percent of the land. By 1991, 33 percent of all agricultural units are
smaller than 5 BIH and control less than 5 percent of the land.
Available data show that sales by parceleros have been far more prevalent in the northern Central
Valley, where production for export crops has been the most profitable (the so-called fruticola or fruit-
growing zone). Land sales have been less common in areas more suited to the production of traditional
crops (the policultura zone). Estimates from a study of parceleros of the metropolitan region,
dominated by the production of export crops, suggest that about 74 percent had sold land by 1982
(Molina 1987). Similarly, Echenique and Rolando s (1991) study indicates that by 1989, parcel sales
were far more widespread in the metropolitan region (where 70.9 percent of the beneficiaries had sold
their land) than in the VIII region (44.8 percent). In our own study ofparcela sales through 1991, the
disparity in total parcels sold between the predominantly fruticultural province of Cachapoal (56.31
percent) and the province of Ñuble (46.2 percent)—while less striking than in the Echenique and
Rolando study—is still significant (see table A-3).
Within each region, important intraregional differences have been observed between comunas that
have been more involved in fruit production and those where fruit production has not yet made such an
inroad. INPROA s (Instituto de Promoción Agraria) 1984 study ofparcelas in the VI region indicates
that 73 percent of the land reform plots had been sold in the comuna of El Olivar—located near the
regional capital, close to the Pan-American highway, and highly specialized in the production of export
crops—compared to a mere 13 percent in the much poorer and more isolated comuna of Las Cabras
(Gómez 1986, p. 23). Echenique and Rolando (1991, pp. 18–19) observe a similar difference within the
metropolitan region, where, by 1989, the proportion of parcels sold ranged from 42 percent in the
comuna of Melipilla to 76 percent in the fruit-growing comuna of Maipo, which has some of the best
land in the country. In our own results for the province of Cachapoal, the percentage ofparcelas sold
by 1991 would increase from 56.3 percent to 67.4 percent if we exclude parcels of land located in the
comuna of Pichidegua, where fruit production has only recently become widely established (table A-3).
The timing of the sales further suggests a connection between the growth of the fruit-exporting
sector and the decline in direct peasant access to land. In the southern part of the Central Valley, where
the expansion of fruit production is a more recent phenomenon, land sales, too, have occurred later. The
cultivation of nontraditional export fruit crops has steadily extended southward (from the northern
provinces of Chile s Central Valley to uble and beyond) (see tables A-4 and A-5). Data suggest that
the rate of expansion of fruit production has coincided with changing rates of land sales. In the north-
central province of Cachapoal, both the rate of increase in the area dedicated to fruit production and the
rate ofparcela sales have declined after 1983 (see table A-7). In uble , meanwhile, the reverse has
taken place. Here, the increase in fruit acreage has been spectacular (a 306 percent increase between
2. The list of "1976 farm units" was formed by reviewing the agrarian reform and parcelation case files maintained by
the Servicio Agricola y Ganadero of the Ministry of Agriculture in Santiago. The list was updated to 1991 with information
obtained at the property registry offices (Conservadores de Bienes Raices) in Cachapoal and Ruble.40
1981/2 and 1991), with the greater part of this expansion occurring after 1987 (see table A-5). At the
same time, the rate of land-reform parcel sales in that province experienced a great increase from 1983
onward, particularly notable after 1987 (see table A-6 and figure A-5).
3
Finally, the increased revenue potential of land under fruit cultivation has driven up land prices
beyond the reach of those who cannot adopt export crops. Regional differences in land prices illustrate
this point clearly. In 1978, 1 hectare of irrigated land in the predominantly fruit-growing region of the
northern Central Valley could command twice as much as agricultural land farther south, in regions less
suited to profitable fruit production (Universidad Católica 1979). Moreover, while the annual rate of
increase in the prices of agricultural land in the center-south region has reached a hitherto unprecedented
3 percent per annum, it still pales by comparison to the rate of increase in land prices for the center-
north fruit region, which has multiplied remarkably from 0.5 percent per annum in 1917-1970 to 12.2
percent per annum in 1974-1978.
A-4 IMPACT OF NONTRADITIONAL EXPORT AGRICULTURE ON LABOR
ABSORPTION
Chile s export boom has excluded smaller farms, which have found it infeasible to adopt fruit
production (section A-2), and has been accompanied by a decline in the direct land access of the rural
poor (section A-3). Such direct exclusionary effects on the resource-poor may be offset by positive
indirect effects from increased employment.
Figures A-6 and A-7 display the relationship between labor absorbed per hectare and the size of
operational farm unit.
4 Both curves confirm the theoretical expectation that smaller farms (less than 8
BIH) are more labor intensive than larger operational units.
For a given agrarian structure, the labor-absorption impact of an export boom would depend, first
and foremost, on the size distribution of the farms adopting the export crop. Farms that dedicate the
greatest proportion of their land to fruit crops are units in the 12-40 BIH category in Cachapoal, and
units exceeding 40 BIH in  uble (see table A-8).
5 These two farm categories are the most labor
intensive of all but also are the smallest in their respective regions.
The full labor-absorption effect of agro-export growth will also depend on whether this
development induces a pattern of structural change that systematically transfers land to producers who
employ more labor. In Cachapoal, land transactions are shifting land from parcelas to the 12-40 BIH
farms (see table A-2). With the exception of the smallest farms in Cachapoal (less than 8 BIH), farms in
the 12-40 BIH category have the highest labor-absorption level (see figure A-6). In uble , the land
market has transferred land to the 12-40 BIH farms as well as to farms exceeding 40 BIH. The impact
of these structural shifts on labor absorption thus remains ambiguous: 12-40 BIH farms display the
lowest employment levels of all farm units, while---next to the smallest units—farms greater than 40
BIH have the highest labor-absorption level in uble (see figure A-7).
3. Of land-reform parcel sales in Ruble prior to 1991, 40.68 percent occurred between 1987 and 1991.
4. The information presented in figures A-6 and A-7 and table A-7 is based on a small subsample of 24 producers and
is, therefore, preliminary.
5. In Ruble, this proportion is still only 8 percent of the total land of the farms.41
A-5 CONCLUSION
The impact of the fruit boom in the province of Cachapoal has been positive in terms of labor
absorption and negative in terms of land access of the resource poor. The percentage of land in the
large-farm area has increased significantly, yet the final outcome has not been a return to a system
dominated by the large estates of the prereform era. Instead, we have noted a shift to medium-sized,
capital-intensive farm units, with a high intensity of wage-labor use. Of all farm sizes, this category
seems best suited to succeed in the production of fruit and vegetables for export. Many observers of the
sector believe—and our experiences in the field confirm that medium-sized farms with a high
concentration of capital are more efficient than the huge haciendas of the past in producing for these
markets.
Land in the south-central region of uble has been moving toward units in the 20-40 BIH
category—which are less labor absorbing than the units they are replacing—and toward units greater
than 40 BIH—which are more labor absorbing than the units they are replacing but larger than the
expanding units in Cachapoal. The land access of the resource-poor has clearly been reduced. However,
the net impact of these structural changes on labor-absorption levels remains unclear.
The greater concentration of land in the south-central region relative to the province of Cachapoal
can be attributed, in part, to the continued dominance of traditional crop agriculture and animal
husbandry. The expansion of fruit production is still a relatively recent phenomenon in the southern
Central Valley. Fruit production covers only 8 percent of the agricultural land in the province of uble
(CIREN 1991). The structural effects of the continued expansion of export agriculture in that region
and its attendant effects on labor absorption remain to be seen.42
TABLE A-1 Size distribution of fruit-growing farms
CACHAPOAL ÑUBLE
FARM SIZE No. of orchards % No. of orchards I %
0-5 ha 435 16.2 68 14.8
5-10 ha 498 18.6 46 10.0
10-20 ha 604 22.5 59 12.8
20-50 ha 579 21.6 89 19.3
>50 ha 563 21.0 198 43.0
Source: CIREN, Catastro Frutícola Nacional, VI Regi n. Actualizaci n 1990 (Santiago:
CIREN-CORFO, 1990). CIREN, Catastro Frutícola Nacional, Vlll Region. Actualizaci n
1991 (Santiago: CIREN-CORFO, 1991).
TABLE A-2 Distribution of land by farm size, 1976 and 1991
ÑUBLE CACHAPOAL
FARM SIZE % holdings % of land holdings % of land
CATEGORY 1976 1991 1976j 1991 19761 1991 19761 1991
_
0-5 BIH 0.0 33.1 0.0 4.9 0.0 20.8 0.0 2.4
5-8 BIH 14.3 10.5 9.8 6.5 0.0 4.0 0.0 1.3
8-12 BIH 76.8 39.1 63.0 32.0 84.4 42.4 45.7 20.8
12-40 BIH 5.4 12.8 10.2 24.7 3.9 20.8 6.3 24.2
>40 BIH 3.6 4.5 17.0 31.9 11.7 12.0 47.9 51.3









THEIR INHERITORS % OF SALES
Cachapoal-VI Región
• Santa Amelia (Rancagua) 6 4 66.67
• California (Requinoa) 17 13 76.47
• San Juan (El Olivar) 9 4 44.44
• Sta. Teresa de Tunca (Codegua) 10 7 70.00
• La Moranina (Rancagua) 7 5 71.43
• La Torina (Pichidegua) 54 25 46.30
Subtotal 103 58 56.31
Ñuble-VIII Region
• Las Pataguas (Coihueco) 36 19 52.78
• El Carmen de Cato (Coihueco) 17 3 17.65
• Sta. Eugenia (Coihueco) 23 14 60.87
• El Carmen (Pinto) 5 3 60.00
• Kilmen (San Nicolas) 7 3 42.86
• San Luis (San Carlos) 9 4 44.44
• Los Galpones (San Carlos) 7 2 28.57
Subtotal 104 48 46.1543
TABLE A-4 Hectares dedicated to fruit plantations
YEAR HECTARES DEDICATED TO FRUIT PLANTATIONS











TABLE A-5 Changes in land area dedicated to fruit plantations
YEAR CHANGES IN LAND AREA DEDICATED TO FRUIT PLANTATIONS
VI Region Cachapoal Province
1982-1986/7 40.50% 57.83% 36.40% 59.17%
1986/7-1990 21.02% 42.17% 18.42% 40.83%
1982-1990 70.03% 100.00% 61.53% 100.00%
1981/2-1987/8
VIII Region uble Province
56.04% 35.60% 146.41% 47.77%
1987/8-1991 64.97% 64.40% 64.95% 52.23%
1981/2-1991 157.42% 100.00% 306.47% 100.00%
TABLE A4 Total sales of parcelas, 1975-1991
CACHAPOAL ÑUBLE
YEAR OF SALE No. of sales % of total No. of sales % of total
1975-1980 31 37.80 29 24.58
1981 10 12.20 10 8.47
1982 4 4.88 8 6.78
1983 9 10.98 8 6.78
1984 6 7.32 8 6.78
1985 4 4.88 3 2.54
1986 3 3.66 4 3.39
1987 1 1.22 10 8.47
1988 5 6.10 10 8.47
1989 5 6.10 10 8.47
1990 3 3.66 14 11.86
1991 1 1.22 4 3.39
Total 82 100.00 118 100.00
Source: Data collected at the Conservadores de Bienes Raices, 1991.44




TABLE A-8 PERCENTAGE OF LAND DEDICATED TO FRUIT AND VEGETABLES BY
FARM SIZE
ÑUBLE CACHAPOAL
FARM-SIZE CATEGORY Veget. Fruit Total Veget. Fruit Total
<8 BIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.05 0.00 32.05
8—12 BIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.57 11.57
12—40 BIH 0.00 1.30 1.30 26.92 32.56 59.48
>40 BIH 0.75 7.33 8.08 0.00 19.01 19.0145
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Figure A-2: Distribution of Land in Cachapoal, 1991
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ANNEX B
Impact of nontraditional agricultural exports
on agrarian structure and labor absorption
in the Highlands of Guatemala
B-1 BACKGROUND
In the following pages, we use survey data gathered in 1990—91 from 300 households in the Central
Highlands of Guatemala to examine how the adoption of nontraditional agricultural exports (NTAX) is
affecting the agrarian structure and the use of labor on these farms. The two major questions are
whether nontraditional exports are helping to reduce inequality in land ownership and use patterns and
whether these new crops are having important labor-absorption effects. As the main body of this paper
demonstrates, these two effects (land distribution and labor absorption) will be integrally linked if the
scale of operation or production affects the intensity of labor utilization on farms. In this case, depend-
ing on the direction of the two effects, the evolution of agrarian structure will, over time, dampen or
magnify the labor-absorption effects of nontraditional export production.
Both questions are of great importance in Guatemala, where land distribution is highly unequal (a
national Gini coefficient of 0.851 in 1979); landholdings among the poor are highly fragmented in the
Highlands (average size of less than 1 acre in our sample of farm households); and labor opportunities
are often far from the family s small farm, requiring costly and disruptive seasonal labor migration. In
other words, if adoption of nontraditional exports in the Central Highlands of Guatemala helps to im-
prove land access of smallholders and increase labor absorption resulting from highlands agriculture,
both direct and indirect benefits for the rural poor could be significant.
This appended report addresses these two questions of how nontraditional exports are affecting
agrarian structure and labor opportunities in the Central Highlands using household-level data from five
villages in a region where exports of winter vegetables, especially broccoli and snow peas, have been
booming. The effort begins with estimating the relationship between the scale of production and the in-
tensity of labor use for the three primary crops raised by these households (broccoli, snow peas, and
corn). Next, the effects of adoption on agrarian structure are analyzed. Here, we introduce the main re-
sults from a paper by Barham, Carter, and Sigelko (1992), which examines adoption and accumulation
patterns in this area. We use these results to construct a predicted land distribution for 1991 and 1995.
This predicted path of agrarian structure is then combined with regression estimates that predict adop-
tion patterns and labor-utilization coefficients for farms by scale of operation to construct labor-
utilization estimates for 1987, 1991, and 1995.
The estimates for 1991 and 1995 assume that adoption patterns are similar to what they were in
1991; they are calculated according to farm size, holding all other household variables constant. For the
1987 labor-utilization estimate, households are assumed to be in a pre-NTAX era (that is, before use of50
nontraditional agricultural exports) and, therefore, growing only the traditional corn crop on their farms.
The final results of these estimates are summarized in the conclusion.
B-2 SCALE OF PRODUCTION AND LABOR ABSORPTION IN DIFFERENT CROPS
For broccoli, snow peas, and corn, we estimated regressions on the relationship between scale of pro-
duction and labor absorption. The dependent variable was labor utilized in all stages of production per
cuerda
1 of land, or labor intensity. The relationship between this measure and the scale of operation was
tested using a range of specifications to see what offered the best prediction of how farm size affected
labor absorption. We also tested the effect ofnontraditional export adoption on labor intensity in tradi-
tional corn production.
Figure B-1 combines the three sets of results in a graph of labor use per cuerda versus scale of
operation in the particular crop, and table B-1 gives the coefficients on each regression. For both broc-
coli and snow peas, there is a declining use of labor as the scale of production expands, while with corn
there appears to be a rather constant labor-absorption coefficient. Corn is less labor intensive than broc-
coli and snow peas as well—especially within the scale of operation for the samplo and is not sensitive
to adoption. Snow peas are the most labor intensive, averaging in our sample about 31 person-days per
cuerda versus 12 person-days per cuerda for corn. Broccoli labor utilization ranges from 30 person-
days per cuerda on a 1-cuerda operation to around 15 person-days on a >5-cuerda scale of operation.
The average in our sample is about 15 person-days per cuerda or about 50 percent of the labor in-
tensity of snow peas but 25 percent greater than corn. In summary, both broccoli and snow pea adop-
tion increase labor absorption, the extent of this increase depends on the scale of production, and snow
pea production has the strongest labor-absorption impacts.
B-3 ADOPTION AND ACCUMULATION PATTERNS IN GUATEMALA
  S LATEST AGRO-
EXPORT BOOM
Barham, Carter, and Sigelko (1992) examine the adoption and accumulation patterns of small-farm
households in the Central Highlands in an attempt to identify the determinants of adoption of nontradi-
tional exports and the effects of adoption on agrarian structure. The regression results on these two
questions are briefly reviewed here before they are put to use in predicting, first, the quantity of land
dedicated by the sample farm households to broccoli, snow peas, and corn, and, second, the evolution of
landholdings for the same households.
Table B-2 presents the results of the adoption regression, which predicts the quantity of land dedi-
cated to the production of nontraditional exports (broccoli and snow peas). The strongest predictors of
land dedicated to exports are farm-size variables, a land-quality index, and the age of the farm operator.
As the dotted curve in figure B-2 shows, all but the smallest of farms in our sample have a high prob-
ability of adoption. A 12-cuerda or 4-acre farm has about a 90 percent probability of being an adopter,
which suggests that participation in this sector is only weakly limited by scale of operation. However,
the solid line depicting the expected land in nontraditional export production demonstrates the rather
1. A Guatemalan unit of land measurement, 1 cuerda equals approximately 0.33 acre.51
rapid leveling off that occurs in the extent of adoption as farm size expands. That is, until farm size ex-
pands to about 45-50 cuerdas (20 acres), or beyond the operating scale of the vast majority of our
sample, the expected land in nontraditional export crops does not grow much beyond 3 cuerdas.
This adoption picture has serious implications for the labor-absorption potential of nontraditional
exports in a smallholder scheme. Our best guess is that the limitation on the extent of adoption for these
smallholders is a credit-risk constraint rather than a problem of labor supervision. On a small sample,
which we supervised, of larger farms in surrounding areas, the extent of adoption was in the 60–100
percent range; in other words, almost all the land was in production of nontraditionals. These larger
farms, we suspect, did not face the credit-risk tradeoffs that confront the smaller-scale farms.
The connection between adoption and accumulation is positive and favors, in our sample, the
smaller adopters. This finding, explained in more detail shortly, is quite consistent with figure B-2,
which predicts that the greatest expansion in land dedicated to the high-value nontraditional exports will
occur among the smaller-scale operators. Hence, it is not surprising that these operators would also be
the most likely land accumulators in the sample, since they would be the most willing to pay the
"opportunity cost" on the land.
The regression framework used in the analysis of how adoption impacts agrarian structure com-
pares the "pre-boom" and "boom" land-accumulation patterns in order to distinguish sharply between
the differentiation patterns that might have been occurring prior to the boom and those that did occurred
once the nontraditional export boom got under way. The regression was on the predicted annual change
in landholdings from the inception of the farm to 1987, and then from 1987 to 1990, with 1987 being
the dividing line between the pre-boom and boom periods. The independent variables were the age and
age squared of the farm household, the initial farm size, and a binary variable on adoption used to shift
both the intercept and the initial farm-size variable. Because of the potential correlation in errors across
the two equations, the regression was specificized as a seemingly unrelated regression system.
The regression results are reported in table B-3, but figures B-3 and B-4 offer a more intuitive rep-
resentation of the outcome. In particular, we use the coefficients to generate a picture of land accumula-
tion trajectories for households over their life cycle, with a 2-cuerda and a 30-cuerda initial endowment.
Each figure has four curves, two representing the adopters and two representing the nonadopters, each
in their "pre-boom" and "boom" trajectories. This two-period portrayal captures the heterogeneity be-
tween the two groups by showing that even in the pre-boom era, those households that eventually be-
came adopters were on a higher accumulation trajectory than nonadopters, and that in the case of the
smaller initial farms (figure B-3), adoption of nontraditionals widens the pre-existing gap between the
two groups. What we call the "structural effect" of nontraditional agricultural exports is captured in
figure B-3 by the area between the two dotted curves minus the area between the two solid curves.
In terms of agrarian-structure impacts, figures B-3 and B-4 suggest that the impact of nontradi-
tional exports in our sample is to reduce the inequality of land distribution by shifting land toward the
smaller-scale producers. It is worth pointing out, however, that our sampling methods did not pick up
any "large" producers, which means that we may have missed a cohort of larger-scale producers who
are also accumulating land.
For the purpose of the exercise pursued in this section, we use the regression results from the
1987–1990 era as a basis for forecasting agrarian structure. The regression results for the second col-52
umn in table B-3 give the predicted annual change in landholdings, and these coefficients are combined
with the household characteristics of our sample in 1987 to forecast the 1991 landholdings. The 1991
landholdings are then used in a similar procedure to forecast their land accumulation to 1991. In both
cases, the actual landholdings in 1987 and the estimated holdings in 1991 are first combined with the
adoption regression coefficients from table B-2 to predict whether households will be adopters of non-
traditional exports prior to the construction of the forecast of trajectories.
B-4 NONTRADITIONAL EXPORTS, AGRARIAN STRUCTURE, AND LABOR
ABSORPTION DYNAMICS
Table B-4 reports the basic labor-absorption results for the three time periods, 1987, 1991, and 1995.
Recall that for the 1987 estimate, producers are treated as if they are growing only corn; in 1991 and
1995, the forecast agrarian structures are mapped against the fitted adoption patterns and labor-
absorption coefficients for the three crops based on 1991 data.
On an average farm, labor absorption increases from 100.89 person-days in 1987, to 120.79 in
1991, and to 123.14 in 1995. In other words, there is about a 20 percent expansion in the labor absorp-
tion of farms in the sample. However, broccoli and snow-pea labor absorption per cuerda are, respec-
tively, 36 percent and 220 percent greater than that of corn, so it is also obvious that the low extent of
adoption pictured in figure B-2 is holding back what would otherwise be a much stronger labor-
absorption impact from nontraditionals. For example, in the 1991 data, of the 7.9 cuerdas on the aver-
age farm, only about 2 cuerdas (or 25 percent) are in nontraditionals. The rest of the land is in corn.
In our 1995 forecast, the extent of adoption rises to almost 29 percent of the average farm (an in-
crease of 4 percent of the farm area). However, the average size of these adopting farms has also in-
creased, which in turn reduces by about 2.6 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively, the labor intensity of
broccoli and snow peas, so that the actual increase in labor absorption over the time period 1991–1995
is only about 2 percent. While the changes in this second period are small, they do demonstrate how
changing agrarian structure can cut in different directions. On the one hand, expanding farm size among
smaller holders is increasing the extent of adoption, since these expanding smaller producers are the
most likely among this sample to increase the amount of land in nontraditionals. On the other hand,
growth in the average farm size of the adopters is also leading to a lower intensity of labor absorption.
These two effects are moving in opposite directions and cause the increase in labor absorption between
1991 and 1995 to be quite small.
B-5 CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis of the impact of nontraditional exports on agrarian structure and labor absorption was
aimed at identifying the extent to which this phenomenon, as it has evolved through 1991 in the Central
Highlands of Guatemala, is improving the basic economic welfare of the rural poor. In terms of agrarian
structure, the effects appear to be positive for those smaller-scale producers who can manage to mobi-
lize the resources to adopt nontraditionals, though the impact on their land access seems to level off with
the accumulation of just a few additional cuerdas of land. This muted impact results from the limited
extent of adoption, which may be a function of limited access to credit and related risk concerns.53
In terms of the labor-absorption effect of the nontraditionals, several meaningful results emerge
from this exercise. First, scale of production does, indeed, appear to matter to the labor-absorption po-
tential of nontraditional exports. In particular, the larger is the scale of production of winter vegetables,
the lower is the intensity of labor use. For policy purposes, it would be useful to know whether this re-
sults from increasing costs involved in supervising hired labor, overutilization of family labor on the
smallest farms, or improved capital access on the larger-scale farms, but we have not yet attempted to
sort this out.
The second result is that the labor-absorption effects of these labor-intensive nontraditional crops
were heavily constrained by the limited extent of adoption in our sample. Only about 25 percent of the
land of the sample households is dedicated to the production of nontraditionals, and this proportion falls
as farm size grows. A nonrandom survey of a cohort of larger nontraditional producers elsewhere re-
vealed a much greater extent of adoption—on the order of 75–100 percent; so it seems that one of the
tradeoffs of a sector where small-scale producer participation is high is a lower extent of adoption and
hence lower labor-absorption potential.
The third result is that changes in agrarian structure within the sample are encouraging further
adoption of nontraditionals, because the smaller-scale operators are, on average, accumulating more
land and hence, over time, are more likely to dedicate some of their land to nontraditionals. The in-
creased extent of adoption that stems from the changing agrarian structure is not large (29 percent com-
pared to 25 percent of total land), but this potential effect of shifting agrarian structure on adoption and
hence on labor absorption is demonstrated.
A fourth and final result is that the same forces that promote increased adoption can cut in the op-
posite direction of increasing labor absorption. That is, as average scale of operation increases for the
smaller growers, their labor-absorption coefficients will also fall because of the scale sensitivity of labor
use. Thus, there is a countervailing effect to the increased adoption between 1991 and 1995, which is
that the average adopter s scale of operation has also increased, resulting in a lower intensity of labor
use in the production of nontraditionals. The extent of this decline is large enough almost to cancel out
the predicted increase in land dedicated to the production of nontraditionals.
In the best of worlds for adoption and accumulation patterns, smaller-scale producers would be
economically able to expand both the extent of their adoption and the size of their farms to overcome the
"microfundization" of agriculture in the Guatemalan Central Highlands. If this were to occur, labor ab-
sorption would surely increase because of the shift toward more labor-intensive crops. It is important to
recognize, though, that the extent of this increase would also appear to be quite sensitive to the average
scale of operation for this "nontraditional" export sector. The data we have now have an important
breach in terms of measurement at the scale of operation that we might imagine this process occurring,
but, as the results of this exercise suggest, it would surely be an error to take the average today and
simply apply it to this new agrarian structure. It is in this sense that the connection between agrarian
structure and labor-absorption potential of different crops deserves additional attention in places where
both direct and indirect effects of structural changes are of concern.54
TABLE B-1 Regression results on labor absorption by crop
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR




Cds in snow peas -13.137839 8.645849
(Cds in snow peas)
2 0.645344 1.683846


















NTAX  Cds 0.468415 0.254565
NTAX  Cds
2 -0.020630 0.01062855
TABLE B-2 Land allocated to nontraditional exports: Tobit estimates
Dependent variable [Land in NTAX-cuerdas)
Log-likelihood = -495.66
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR
Constant -2.569 1.483
Farm size (cuerdas) 0.9211   0.1353
Farm size squared -3.492E-02   6.632E-03












Age -0.577   0.0153

















  The education index is constructed such that the first digit indicates the level and the
second digit represents the number of grades completed at that level: level 0=none;
level 1=primary, grades=l 6; level 2=secondary, grades=l 6; level 3=university,
grades=l 8.
   Significant at the 95% confidence level.56
TABLE B-3 SUR results on land accumulation per-year and adoption, pre-boom and
boom
























Age 0.0503 0.0122  -0.0260 0.0487 0.0477 0.0116 
Age squared -0.0013 0.0004 0.0004 0.0012 -0.0012 0.0003 
Land (initial
farm size) -0.0239 0.0056  -0.0238 0.0187 -0.0241 0.0054 
NTAX 0.1412 0.0500  0.4483 0.2235  0.1634 0.0577 









Figures in brackets are standard errors;   denotes significance at the 95% confidence level.
TABLE B-4 Simulation results on labor absorption, 1987, 1991, and 1995
LABOR MEASURES 1987 1991 1995
Broccoli labor days/cuerda -- 16.69 16.24
Snow pea labor days/cuerda -- 39.61 39.45
Corn labor days /cuerda 12.13 12.29 12.46
Total labor
absorption 100.89 120.79 123.1457
Figure B-1:
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Figure B-3
Estimated Land Accumulation Trajectories
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AND EXCLUSIONARY AGRO-EXPORT GROWTH
IN PARAGUAY
C-1 BACKGROUND
The Paraguayan economy is overwhelmingly dependent on agriculture and related activities. In 1989, a
full 96 percent of total exports were accounted for by agricultural, livestock, and forestry products.
While stagnant relative to the rest of Latin America up through the 1950s, Paraguay s agricultural
economy has been one of fastest growing in the region since 1970. In particular, the export sector has
grown rapidly over this period (FIDA 1990). While the rate of expansion slowed with recession in the
1980s, agrarian growth has remained healthy.
Unlike many other Latin American countries, Paraguay s export sector depends heavily on small-
farm production. Cotton is produced primarily by small farmers—almost 70 percent of the area dedi-
cated to cotton in 1981 was on farms less than 20 hectares in size—and cotton alone accounted for more
than one-third of total exports in 1990. Despite this dependence on the small-farm sector, Paraguay has
a highly skewed land distribution.l.
) With almost 60 percent of the population rural, the unequal distribu-
tion of land is potentially an issue of considerable importance. Nevertheless, until recently the country
had not experienced the sort of violent agrarian conflict common to many countries with an extremely
skewed land distribution. Nor has Paraguay undergone the rapid, uncontrolled urbanization that has
been typical of many other Latin American countries and is indicative of the rural population s losing its
access to land.
One reason why concentration of landownership has not until recently proved an explosive issue is
that in the past, owners of large amounts of land tolerated widespread squatting on areas that they were
not using, often a major proportion of their holding. In addition to informal occupation, there were legal
ways to lay claim to unused land. From the 1960s onward, an official colonization policy distributed
state-owned land, much of it in remote parts of the interior and border areas, while encouraging private
colonization schemes. Through the 1970s, farmers feeling the land squeeze had the option of joining one
of these official colonization programs or, as many thousands more did, of simply occupying newly
opened lands in the hope that their presence would convince the owner, private or public, to sell it to
them, a strategy that frequently worked.
Land pressure in Paraguay has increased in recent years as the processes that mitigated land hun-
ger have functioned less and less effectively. State-owned land available for distribution through the
colonization program was significantly diminished by the late 1970s. The construction of roads into the
1. Conventional land distribution figures for Paraguay are misleading because of the extreme concentration of landown-
ership in the Gran Chaco.60
fertile eastern border areas in the late 1970s and 1980s encouraged many foreigners, especially Brazil-
ians, to immigrate to these regions, where land was often one-tenth the price of similar land across the
border (Wilson, Hay, and Margolis 1989, p. 207). While fueling an agro-export boom in the frontier
area, this immigration of better-capitalized, large-scale farmers, who found Paraguayan land prices a
bargain, tended to push prices up in the border areas, making land increasingly more difficult for poor
Paraguayans to purchase. In addition, throughout the 1980s, population continued to grow at 3.2 per-
cent, one of the highest rates in Latin America; but since land had become more valuable, new squatters
were more often evicted. The confluence of these circumstances left the younger generation with very
few options for obtaining land to farm as they entered adulthood. As a result, organized land invasions,
sometimes ending in violent confrontations, became more and more common throughout the 1980s.
Following a brief review of the evolving agrarian problem in Paraguay as seen in an analysis of
agricultural census data, the remainder of this appendix will devote itself to understanding the form of
agrarian growth along Paraguay
 s eastern border. While not the only factor behind Paraguay s land
problem, the exclusionary pattern taken by this growth is clearly a major contributing factor.
C-2 EVOLVING AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN PARAGUAY: LAND HUNGER IN THE MIDST
OF RAPID AGRO-EXPORT GROWTH
Increasingly frequent land invasions and other land-access confrontations convincingly testify to the
growing problem of land hunger in Paraguay. In an effort to understand the appearance of agrarian un-
rest within the midst of a growing and otherwise successful agrarian economy, a number of analysts
have tried to decompose the forces behind the problematic pattern of land access. One of the latest con-
tributions on this topic is an analysis by Luis Galeano (1992), based on preliminary statistics from the
1991 agricultural census, of changes in agrarian structure during the 1980s. This section will present
Galeano
 s hypotheses on changing patterns of landownership at the aggregate census level as a starting
point for this paper s analysis of changes in land access and ownership at the farm level.
C-2.1 IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION AND POPULATION GROWTH ON
CAMPESINO LAND ACCESS
Galeano (1992) identifies two interacting processes that have a profound effect on the ability of differ-
ent classes to retain their relative shares of land over time. The first is the steady and long-term increase
in land pressure due to the natural increase in the population. This process is most important among
small farmers in the older and more densely populated areas of the country, specifically what is usually
called the central region—the departments of Central, Cordillera, Paraguari, and Guaira—as well as the
more distant departments of Concepción, Neembucn, and Misiones.
The effect this process has on farm size depends on several factors related to the possibilities of
off-farm employment. Galeano (1992) describes two systems that have emerged to siphon off excess
labor in the densely populated areas where land is less available. One is permanent out-migration, which
can be to other rural areas, to an urban center, or out of the country altogether, usually to urban areas of
Brazil or Argentina. The other is seasonal or temporary employment in agriculture, industry, or the ur-
ban informal sector. Again, this might include a short-term move out of the country; in the past, Para-
guayans often worked as migrant agricultural laborers, especially picking cotton, in northern Argentina.61
Nonagricultural temporary work would be most relevant closer to Asunción, which would include the
department of Central and parts of Paraguari and Cordillera.
Both types of off-farm employment relieve pressure from the land market by taking some people
out of competition for agricultural land on a temporary or permanent basis. When sources of such em-
ployment dry up, land pressure increases, and the result is expressed either within the campesino econ-
omy through minifundization, that is, the fragmentation of minifundio holdings, or outside the campes-
ino economy in the form of land invasions of latifundios. Thus the effect of this process on size distri-
bution of landholdings is quite variable, depending on the exact combination of conditioning factors:
whether alternative employment possibilities exist, whether they are reliable or unpredictable, what pro-
portion of excess labor they are capable of absorbing, the availability and affordability of additional
agricultural land for small farmers, and whether there are underexploited large properties available for
land invasions by those who cannot find alternative employment or their own land to cultivate.
The second process that affects the evolution of agrarian structure is the impact of the capitalist
modernization of some farms on the rest of the agricultural sector. Starting in the 1970s, large agricul-
tural enterprises using modern technology began to move into Paraguay, especially into the border de-
partments such as Itapna. These enterprises ranged in size from capitalized family farms in the 20–50
hectare range to agribusinesses over 1,000 hectares in size. They were differentiated from traditional
Paraguayan farms not only in their use of modern technological production methods and their far
greater degree of insertion into the market economy but also in the kinds of cash crops they grew—most
often soybeans and to a lesser extent wheat—and the nationality of their owners, who were more likely
not to be native Paraguayans. The development of this sector was accompanied, and probably acceler-
ated, by government policies on research, credit, prices, and exchange rates that favored the crops and
production technologies of this type of enterprise. The pricing mechanism for export crops provides a
prime example. The price of soybeans during this period was not controlled and thus fluctuated with the
price on the international market. In contrast, the price and exchange rate for cotton was set by the gov-
ernment each year in such a way that, according to most analysts, exporters captured most of the profit,
and producers very little (Nagel 1991, p. 114; Fogel 1989, p. 35).
According to Galeano (1992), the effect of this capitalist transformation of some farms on the rest
of the agricultural sector is rapid and generalized, characterized by abrupt, even erratic, changes of di-
rection. He believes that because of this, modernization of agricultural production has resulted in accel-
erated socioeconomic differentiation among small farmers and may even be leading to the disintegration
of the small-farm sector. Presumably, differentiation is occurring primarily because the increase in the
number of modern farming operations has driven up the price of land beyond what small farmers using
traditional methods of cultivation can afford to pay. Because the areas where this process is occurring
tend to be located far from cities, off-farm employment is less of an option than elsewhere, and farmers
must rely on their agricultural production as their main source of income. Since they cannot compete
with their more technologically oriented neighbors in the land market, they either are forced into a proc-
ess of increasing minifundization or else are driven to take part in confrontational activities like land
invasions.
The impact of agricultural modernization on all size classes of farmers was intensified by the eco-
nomic crisis of the early 1980s. The global recession of this period led to a drop in the prices of the
major cash crops in Paraguay, both those for export (cotton and soybeans) and those for internal con-
sumption (principally wheat). The recession was compounded by the ending of the economic boom that62
resulted from the construction of the Itapua dam. While prices fell, the cost of imported inputs such as
pesticides, fertilizer, machinery, and oil did not, leading to a greatly reduced profitability that affected
all classes of farmers, albeit unequally.
The two processes described, which Galeano (1992) identifies as shaping changes in agrarian
structure, tend to have their greatest impact in different parts of the country. While the first, the increas-
ing demand for land resulting from natural increase in the population, is most important in older areas;
the second, resulting from capitalist modernization of some farms, is occurring largely in areas opened
to settlement more recently, such as Itapua and San Pedro. The major difference between the two proc-
esses, according to Galeano, is in the potential for small-farmer adaptation to the changes they cause.
Small farmers as a class have been able to respond to changes in land availability brought about by the
growing population in older areas by removing themselves temporarily or permanently from the land
market through other types of employment. They have been far less able to respond adequately to the
complex and abrupt transformations caused by modern capitalist agricultural production and, in the
areas affected by that process, have lost ground to other classes of farmers. In these areas, Galeano hy-
pothesizes, large agribusinesses would be expected to predominate in the long run from an economic
point of view, because other types of farms are not as profitable and simply cannot compete with them
in the land market. However, this conclusion might prove incorrect, depending on what effect the inte-
gration of the economies of the Southern Cone has on the competitiveness of these firms and on whether
they can successfully challenge the predominance of the traditional and politically connected largeholder
class.
C-2.2 CHANGING PATTERNS OF LAND ACCESS THROUGH THE 1980S
According to Galeano s 1992 analysis, the patterns of change in landholding in Paraguay are multiple
and depend on a number of factors, as described above. He finds ample support for his reading of these
patterns in the changes in landholding that occurred during the 1980s, captured in his comparison of the
results of the 1981 and 1991 agricultural censuses.
Overall, the proportion of all farms with less than 5 hectares has increased in this period from 36
percent to 40 percent (see tables 1 and 2, in Galeano 1992), supporting a view of increasing minifundi-
zation at the national level. But the increase in this size class has been strikingly different in different
regions. In areas where the transformation to modern capitalist farming has been most extensive or
where the agricultural frontier has closed—and where off-farm employment possibilities are the least
common—land pressure is more intense and generalized and the increase in very small plots is greatest.
Thus in Itapua, plots less than 5 hectares have increased by 112 percent, and in San Pedro, by 110 per-
cent. In older areas with no agricultural frontier and very little capitalist transformation of agriculture—
but where off-farm employment opportunities are not abundant—this size class showed a moderate in-
crease: in Concepción, 36 percent; and in Misiones, 13 percent. These areas have also experienced sig-
nificant land invasions. Finally, in older areas with more nonagricultural employment opportunities, the
number of farms with fewer than 5 hectares has expanded very little—in the most extreme case, only 5
percent for the department of Central.
The 5–10-hectare size class has shown similar trends. This class has expanded significantly in re-
gions such as San Pedro and Itapna while it has diminished in both absolute and relative terms in less
dynamic areas. The relative stability of this class in the older areas is consistent with the fact of numer-
ous off-farm employment possibilities in those locales. The increase in the 5–10-hectare class in the63
newer areas, Galeano speculates, may be a result of the disintegration of farms of 10–20 hectares, a
common size for lots sold under the colonization program. Also, as land pressure has increased in these
areas, the size of lots given out in response to land invasions has decreased, so that now they are com-
monly less than 10 hectares.
A 10–20-hectare lot is considered a good-sized farm under traditional cultivation methods in Para-
guay, large enough to support an average family with a minimum of off-farm labor. In almost all de-
partments in the eastern region, the proportion of farms in this class has fallen over the last ten years.
Disaggregating by department, the absolute number in this class has risen in some of the more dynamic
departments, especially those with the most active agricultural frontier; those whose colonization era is
more remote show less of an increase in absolute numbers or none at all. In the older areas, this size
class has declined in both absolute and relative numbers. The trend throughout the country toward fewer
exploitations capable of sustaining an average farm family is seen by Galeano (1992) as strong evidence
of a process of disintegration of the small-farm sector in face of changes that have occurred in the agri-
cultural economy.
Farms between 20 and 100 hectares in size are difficult to exploit fully using only traditional culti-
vation methods and family labor; they are much more likely to be capitalized family farms, which the
Paraguayans refer to, using the English, as the "farmer" type in order to differentiate them from tradi-
tional campesino production. Galeano finds that this class is the only one that has decreased at the na-
tional level in both relative and absolute terms during the last decade. The decline was substantial both
nationally and in the areas where this stratum was most important. Nationally, the number of farms in
this class shrank by 10 percent during the past decade, and in Itapua, where there is a large concentra-
tion of capitalized family farms, the corresponding figure is 21 percent. It might seem that these larger
and more prosperous farms should have been in a better position to defend themselves against the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1980s than the smaller campesino farms, but in fact they proved more vulnerable.
According to Galeano (1992), this class has experienced major profitability problems since the early
1980s. Distress sales of parts of larger farms due to these difficulties might, he believes, account for
both the decline in numbers of this class and the rise in numbers of the smaller size classes in the more
dynamic areas, such as San Pedro and Itapna.
Interestingly, even the relatively large 100–500-hectare class has not expanded significantly in the
last ten years, growing by only 7 percent at the national level. Those farms in this class that are largely
agricultural—rather than oriented toward cattle production—have experienced the same difficulties as
the capitalized family-farm sector, and the departments in which this type of farm is concentrated have
shown the greatest decline of this class. In Itapua, one of the hardest hit regions, the number of farms in
this size class declined by 25 percent. Exploitations in this size class that combine cattle production with
agriculture or which are wholly dedicated to cattle have, however, increased in number. This is the case
in the department of Presidente Hayes in the Chaco, where the number of farms in this class rose 350
percent over the decade.
The economic crisis, which has had such a negative impact on small- and medium-sized farms, has
evidently not affected the profitability of medium and large agribusinesses to nearly the same extent, at
least if this impact can be measured in the increase or decrease of the number of farms in the class. In
the 500–1,000-hectare class, those landholdings that rely largely on cattle production tend to use tradi-
tional methods and have shown no substantive change in numbers over the decade. But in areas where
this size of farm tends to be devoted to agriculture, the number of farms has increased dramatically—by64
67 percent in Itapna, for example. Similarly, the largest size class of exploitations—those with over
1,000 hectares—has not grown much in regions dominated by the traditional latifundio/minifundio di-
chotomy, except in the Chaco, where land prices are very low and the land supports only a very exten-
sive type of cattle production. But overall, this class has grown by 39 percent nationally, with higher
rates of growth in the most dynamic departments, where farms of this size are most likely to be devoted
to agriculture. For example, the number of farms over 1,000 hectares grew 42 percent in San Pedro, and
51 percent in Itapua.
The picture that emerges from this analysis of the changes in landownership over the last ten years
is one of a small-farm sector that is at best stagnant and at worst disintegrating; a capitalized family-
farm sector unable to compete with agribusinesses; and a small agribusiness sector losing ground to
larger agribusinesses—in short, an agricultural economy tending toward extremes. Galeano
 s 1992
analysis emphasizes several points. First, the difficult position of medium-sized farms is directly related
to the economic crisis of the 1980s and particularly to the fall in world prices of Paraguay s major cash
crops. If either prices or cropping patterns should change, the medium-sized farms might be able to re-
gain the ground they have lost. Second, the stagnation and disintegration of the small-farm sector is de-
pendent on a number of interacting conditions, especially the possibilities for off-farm employment and
the existence of an agricultural frontier. Also, the sector as a whole has shown remarkable staying
power due to small farmers  ability to adapt their survival strategies to changing circumstances. For
these reasons, it would be premature to write off this sector as doomed to disappear. Finally, the me-
dium- and large-scale agribusiness sector has benefited in the past from state policies that favor these
farms  production methods and the crops they tend to grow. These policies have undergone some change
recently and are sure to be modified further as the new government in Paraguay works out its economic
strategy, which will need to chart the course both of recovery from the current economic crisis and of
sustainable and stable future development. In short, the trends described in this section are not inexora-
ble historical processes but rather are dependent on particular circumstances, which are subject to
change induced by both the economic and the policy environments.
C-3 RESOURCE ALLOCATION, LABOR ABSORPTION, AND THE SMALL-FARM
COMPETITIVENESS GAP
In an effort to understand the mechanics of growth and induced structural change, a comprehensive sur-
vey was undertaken in three regions of Paraguay. Details of the survey methodology are presented in
Carter, Luz, and Galeano (1992). This section discusses results of analysis of the economics of produc-
tion and resource allocation in the eastern frontier section of Paraguay (specifically, the department of
Itapua).
Production, income, and land-transaction data from a sample of 123 producers in Itapúa were used
to estimate the fundamental economic relationships that shape the direct and indirect effects of agro-
export growth on the rural resource poor. (These relationships are discussed and displayed for a hypo-
thetical case in figures la-lc in section 2 of the main text.) In all cases, ordinary least-squares regres-
sion was used to the relationships. The actual specification and parameter estimates are presented in a
table that comes at the end of this annex.
The estimated relationships for Itapúa are displayed in figures C-1 to C-3. Figure C-1 displays the
estimated relationship between the number of labor-days absorbed per hectare and the operational size65
of farm.
2 As can be seen, labor absorption falls from 150 labor-days/hectare to 30 labor-days per-
hectare as one moves a unit of land from a 5-hectare to a 100-hectare farm. Given this sharp difference
in choice of technique between small and large farms, any structural change that shifts land from the
small- to the large-farm sector will have severely negative net-employment effects.
Figure C-2 presents an estimate of the marginal economic value of 1 hectare of land to a family
(holding labor, machinery, and animal stocks constant). The displayed relationship is based on the table
C-1 regression, which explains net family income as a function of land and other resource stocks. The
estimated coefficients were used to calculate the marginal value of land, A (formally calculated using the
derivative 8n/8T, where it is family income and T is farm size). Unlike the other regions of Paraguay,
where the marginal value of land slopes downward as a function of farm size, the estimated A increases
by a factor of 10 as farm size increases from 10 to 100 hectares in Itapna. Even without capitalizing
this estimate into a willingness-to-pay measure (p in the notation of section 2), this estimated A function
points to a strong competitive disadvantage for small farmers in this region.
The microeconomics of production in Itapna thus create the foundation for the strongly exclusion-
ary growth trajectory hypothesized by Galeano (1992). Larger farm units are much more competitive
than small farmers in terms of their marginal land valuation, and the farm-size differentiated patterns of
labor absorption indicate severe declines in labor demand as land shifts from small to large units.
C-4 LAND MARKET AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
So how has this highly skewed competitiveness regime worked out over time given the incentives created
by the agro-export boom in Paraguay s eastern region? Figure C-4 (taken from Carter, Luz, and
Galeano 1992) confirms that real land price in Itapúa has markedly increased since the agro-export
boom got under way around 1970.
3 As noted in section C-1 above, the real appreciation of land was
hypothesized to have put tremendous pressure on smallholders. Figure C-5 (also taken from Carter,
Luz, and Galeano 1992) compares individuals  self-reported "willingness to pay for land" with actual
land prices. As can be seen, producers with less than about 40 hectares are shown to be unwilling to pay
the market price to acquire land. Consistent with the A function estimated from production and income
information, figure C-5 indicates that the economics of agro-export production in Itapúa a leave smaller-
scale producers uncompetitive in the land market.
Figure C-3 is the analogue to figure 1-c discussed in section 2. Displayed in figure C-3 is the esti-
mated average annual land accumulation for farms of different farm sizes over the 1970–1991 period.
Specifically, average annual land accumulation is defined as (T1991-T1970)/(91-70), where T1991 is the
amount of land owned by the farm in 1991, and T1970 is the amount owned in 1970. The regression es-
timates on which figure C-3 are based are reported in table C-1. Because farmers might be thought to
behave differently based on where they are in their life cycles, figure C-3 displays the rate of land ac-
cumulation for different stages of the life cycle. Not surprisingly, the rates of accumulation are much
2. The actual regression results in table C-1 are for the total monetary value of labor absorbed. Figure C-1 was con-
structed by dividing expected monetary expenditures by the average wage and then transforming this figure to a per-hectare
basis.
3. As detailed in Carter, Luz, and Galeano (1992), figure C-4 is based around regression estimates of the real land price
using historical data on transactions collected from the cross-sectional sample of Itapua producers.66
higher for individuals at early points of their life cycle (5 years after they began farming) than they are
later in their life cycle (25 years after they began farming).
The broad structural pattern described by Galeano (1992) and discussed in section C-1 above is
indeed visible in these microeconomic data. Large farms (those that began the export boom with 50–100
hectares) accumulate land at an average rate of 15–20 hectares per year. Initially, smaller units accumu-
late at a much slower rate. Note that these estimates do not show the impact of those small farmers who
actually exited the sector inasmuch as they were no longer operating farms in 1991 and were unavail-
able to be interviewed. The smaller farms in figure C-3 are thus a survivor class of sorts.
C-5 POLICIES TO RESOLVE EXCLUSIONARY GROWTH
As discussed in section 5 of the main paper, land market reform has been put forward as a policy that
might alleviate exclusionary aspects of agro-export growth. Within Paraguay itself, land market reform
is under discussion as a market-based alternative to traditional state-mandated, redistributive reform.
Unfortunately, the analysis here suggests there is little hope for such policies by themselves to rectify
the exclusionary nature of growth in eastern Paraguay.
Land-mortgage banks, one of the key policies within the land market-reform policy arsenal, make
long-term finance available to smallholders at competitive rates. Such finance would be useful if small
producers were fundamentally competitive in the land market (in the sense of our 0 measure) but were
constrained in their land purchases by lack of savings or access to capital. However, figure C-3 strongly
shows that the smaller-scale, labor-absorbing producers are not competitive.
A second land market-reform policy instrument is land banks, which are useful in a context where
transactions costs essentially lead to what might be termed "land market segmentation,
" meaning that
small purchasers cannot buy land from large holders. Essentially, smallholders are in a different market.
Figure C-6 (taken from Carter, Luz, and Galeano 1992) gives prima facie evidence of land-market
segmentation in Paraguay. Land purchased in small units (controlling for quality) commands a higher
price per hectare than land purchased in larger blocks. A land bank that publicly bore transactions costs
of subdivision of large farms would permit small purchases to be made at the advantageous large-farm
price.
Figure C-5, however, shows that such reform would have no effect on the land-market competi-
tiveness of small farmers. The horizontal line drawn across figure C-5 is an estimate of the per-hectare
price paid by larger farm units. As can be seen, that price still lies above the average self-reported will-
ingness to pay of small farmers. Hence, even a land bank would do little to reshape the economic incen-
tives that drive the induced structural-change component of eastern Paraguay s exclusionary growth
process. As Carter, Luz, and Galeano (1992) document, working capital appears to be the fundamental
constraint that dampens the competitiveness of small producers all over Paraguay. If growth is to be
made less exclusionary, it will surely require attention to this fundamental capital-market problem.67
TABLE C-1 Fundamental regressions
1) Labor absorption
Dependent variable: Value of labor absorbed (000 of guaranies)
R
2 =0.437
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR
Constant 2804.12 782.21





Department 7 dummy 1035.62 861.47
Cultivated land • Dept 7 dummy -121.45 106.10
(Cultivated land)
2 • Dept 7 dummy 2.89 3.15
(Cultivated land)
3 • Dept 7 dummy -0.02 0.02
Department 9 dummy -287.38 919.70
Cultivated land • Dept 9 dummy -48.57 119.26
(Cultivated land)
2 • Dept 9 dummy 1.70 3.31
(Cultivated land)
3 • Dept 9 dummy -0.01 0.02
2) Net family income and value of land
Dependent variable: Net family income (000 of guaranies)
R
2 = 0.614
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR
Constant -2965.70 2158.91






Animal stock 0.47 0.19
Family labor stock 753.97 416.55
Department 7 dummy 3670.12 2571.20
Cultivated land • Dept 7 dummy -348.12 259.83
(Cultivated land)
2 • Dept 7 dummy 3.29 7.38
(Cultivated land)
3 • Dept 7 dummy 2e-3 0.05
Machinery • Dept 7 dummy -1.15 1.16
Animal stock • Dept 7 dummy -0.33 0.22
Family labor stock • Dept 7 dummy 37.92 516.08
Department 9 dummy 3661.83 2662.49
Cultivated land • Dept 9 dummy -374.22 300.76
(Cultivated land)
2 • Dept 9 dummy 4.29 7.78
(Cultivated land)
3 • Dept 9 dummy -0.01 0.05
Machinery • Dept 9 dummy -0.70 1.17
Animal stock • Dept 9 dummy -0.25 0.44
Family labor stock • Dept 9 dummy -555.00 633.8068
3) Net annual land purchase or sale
Dependent variable: (T92-T7o / 22)
R
2 = 0.174
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Figure C-4: Real Land Appreciation
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